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I.  INTRODUCTION: VAST LEGAL THOUGHTS 
All of law depends on vast concepts that stretch across time, space, 
causation, and agency. Far-reaching concepts make law possible from 
legislation and interpretation to enforcement and adjudication; from 
weighing evidence to establishing motive and intent; and from imposing 
fines or sentences to awarding compensation. But all of human thought and 
memory is just here and now. The vast dependencies of time, space, 
causation, and agency must exist in individual brains. How we manage to 
use here-and-now mental processes to produce legal concepts that stretch 
very broadly over vast expanses of our lives, institutions, and worlds is the 
point of this Article. We will discuss how human beings transform vast 
dependencies that stretch across time, space, causation, and agency into 
tractable, much smaller, and more compact concepts that we can hold onto, 
manipulate, and develop. We will explain how these compact concepts are 
“blends” for thinking about much larger mental webs of ideas that are too 
large to hold in mind themselves. We will also suggest a research agenda 
that may allow us to better understand what sorts of blends work, and 
which ones we discard and when. 
Examples of blends are everywhere in law. A “decedent” in law, for 
example, is a kind of agent who exists (but does not live) in the present, 
who is imbued with some of the intentionality of a person who once 
existed, and for whom there are documentary records expressing this past 
intentionality. We refer to the decedent in the present tense: “The decedent 
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leaves his house to his spouse”; or in the present perfect: “The decedent has 
left his house to his spouse”; but not in the past tense: “The decedent left 
his house to his spouse.” Thus, a decedent is not merely a dead person, but 
rather an agent who exists in the here and now, despite being dead, to 
whom we are obligated, and failure to execute these obligations can bring 
current penalties to those who are present. 
There is a tradition, stretching over centuries, of considering the 
difficulties encountered in law that derive from the complexity of thinking 
over the vast conceptual expanses of time, space, causation, and agency. 
For example, assessing culpability depends on mentally juggling and 
comparing alternative ideas of complex events. This kind of counterfactual 
mental juggling of ideas that stretch across time, space, causation, and 
agency is a central subject of H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré’s work on the 
consideration of causation in the law.1 As an instance of the challenge that 
arises constantly in law from thinking with a vast scope, consider the 
standard sine qua non legal test (that is, the “but-for” test). The sine qua 
non test is conducted in the following way: to determine whether a causal 
connection can be ruled out between a certain agency and a specific harm, 
imagine that the agent had not acted (or failed to act) and ask yourself, 
would the harm still have happened?2 Clearly, this is an imaginative 
exercise stretching across far-reaching concepts, some of them necessarily 
counterfactual. 
Laws are also meant to apply across vast ranges of time, space, 
causation, and agency; indeed, the very foundation of common law is stare 
decisis.3 We will briefly review these expanses. Many of our most 
cherished concepts of laws date back across many centuries. Parts of the 
Magna Carta, dated 1215 CE, that limit the power of the throne, remain on 
the books of England and Wales. No doubt, the conceivers of the charter in 
 
 1. E.g., H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 4 (2d ed. 1985) (“The 
terminology of legal rules often tempts courts to consider these issues in the form of questions whether 
the harm was the ‘consequence’ or ‘effect’ or ‘caused by’ the wrongful act, or whether it was ‘too 
remote’ or ‘insufficiently proximate’ . . . .”). For a survey of the literature on causation in the law, see 
generally Antony Honoré, Causation in the Law, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, (Nov. 17, 
2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/ entries/causation-law. For a broader survey of 
academic views of causation, see generally MENNO HULSWIT, FROM CAUSE TO CAUSATION: A 
PEIRCEAN PERSPECTIVE (2002). 
 2. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1517, 1556 n.92 (2004) (citing MARK TURNER, COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL 
SCIENCES (2001)). 
 3. Amy Gutmann, Preface to ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW, at vii, xi (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION].  
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1215 CE could not have imagined the future specific details, but the 
principles of the Magna Carta are still taken as applying across eight 
centuries. The Bill of Rights of 1688 together with the Act of Settlement of 
1701 are still in effect and are part of the main constitutional laws 
governing freedom of speech and the requirement of regular elections to 
parliament.4 They also specify the rules for succession to the throne of the 
United Kingdom.5 In the United States, while the Articles of Confederation 
and Perpetual Union were perpetual for only eight years,6 the new 
Constitution of the United States, adopted in 1788, is still in effect more 
than two and a quarter centuries hence.7  
The idea of a “legal person” was not invented in 2010 by the Roberts 
Court in Citizens United v. FEC.8 On the contrary, it derives in part from 
the application of the contracts clause in Article 1, section 10 of the U.S. 
Constitution as established in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 
nearly two centuries previous in 1819.9 The Court recognized the standing 
of a chartered corporation (even though it was chartered by King George 
III of England in 1769) as a kind of legal person that has rights, standing, 
and obligations.10 This chartered corporation did not count as exactly a 
person but rather as a legal person—a kind of blended entity. This legal 
fiction was expanded in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad 
in 1886,11 but recently delimited by the Court in FCC v. AT&T Inc. in 
2011, when the Court ruled that not all of the rights to privacy granted 
persons under the Freedom of Information Act apply to corporations.12 
While not widely understood, corporations not only own property but also 
 
 4. For further discussion on the impact of the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights of 1688, and the 
Act Settlement of 1701, see THE CONCISE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
HISTORY 9 (Michael Kazin, Rebecca Edwards & Adam Rothman eds., 2011). 
 5. See Succession and Precedent: Succession, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE BRITISH MONARCHY, 
http://www.royal.gov.uk/ThecurrentRoyalFamily/Successionandprecedence/Succession/Overview.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
 6. See Primary Documents in American History: The Articles of Confederation, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/articles.html; ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION of 1781. 
 7. For a more thorough review of American political history, see generally THE CONCISE 
PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY, supra note 4. 
 8. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (returning to the principle that “the 
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity,” whether 
nonprofit or for profit). 
 9. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 613–14 (1819). 
 10. Id. at 619.  
 11. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution, which forbids a state to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws applies to corporations.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12. FCC v. AT & T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011). 
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are entitled to a vote, just as individuals, in referenda on special 
assessments across the country in proportion to the benefits they will 
receive from whatever the assessment is going to be used for.13 This is so 
even if they are not American companies.14 
There is also a plethora of examples of how laws stretch over vast 
spaces. Human beings live in the here and now. We are able to extend the 
empire of our law across vast ranges of the planet. A single legal entity (the 
sovereign United States) in a deal with another legal entity (France), in a 
transaction of questionable constitutionality,
15
 annexed land to itself via the 
Louisiana Purchase, land that would eventually form part or all of fifteen 
states.16 Later, the U.S. government, in the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, 
Limits and Settlement between the United States and the Mexican 
Republic, annexed territory that eventually formed part of ten states.17 The 
Gadsden Purchase in 1853 annexed lands that were eventually added to 
Arizona and New Mexico.18 The purchase of Alaska as a department of the 
federal government in 1867, and its subsequent reorganization as a district, 
then a territory, and finally a state,19 along with annexation of the sovereign 
state of Hawaii as a territory of the United States under the Newlands 
Resolution in 1898,20 also greatly extended the American empire and the 
reach of its laws. Most Americans at the time, and indeed, most lawmakers 
of the time, would never see the vast stretches of the American landscape 
added by these actions. Indeed, maps were not sufficiently detailed at the 
time to specify exact boundaries.21 
In various ways, each state can also extend the reach of its laws far 
beyond the bounds of the state’s geography and circumstances. For 
example, over 50 percent of U.S. publicly traded corporations and 60 
 
 13. Vladimir Kogan & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Problem with Being Special: Democratic 
Values and Special Assessments, 14 PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL’Y 4, 8 (2009).  
 14. See id.  
 15. See THOMAS FLEMING, THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 131–45 (2003) (discussing the 
“constitutional bending” involved in the Louisiana Purchase). 
 16. For an in-depth discussion of the Louisiana Purchase, see generally id. 
 17. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2, 
1848, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207. 
 18. Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/GadsdenPurchase (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
 19. Purchase of Alaska, 1867, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/AlaskaPurchase (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
 20. Annexation of Hawaii, 1898, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/Hawaii (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
 21. For a geographical review of the United States and how the nation was mapped, see generally 
SUSAN SCHULTEN, MAPPING THE NATION: HISTORY AND CARTOGRAPHY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA (2012). 
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percent of the Fortune 500 companies, which we think of as individual 
entities, are in fact spatially incorporated in Delaware,22 extending the laws 
of Delaware across the United States and, indeed, around the globe. 
Returning to the core Hart and Honoré argument, laws and legal 
institutions require us to understand vastly complex chains of causation.23 
Take, for example, liability for environmental damages. The 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(“CERCLA”) was enacted by Congress to reduce the threat to public health 
and the environment posed by the widespread use and disposal of 
hazardous substances.24 Its purpose was to ensure the prompt and effective 
cleanup of waste-disposal sites, and to assure that parties responsible for 
hazardous substances bore the cost of remedying the conditions they had 
created.25 The Act assigned liability for cleanup to those parties that 
committed any of seven prohibited acts: discharged, deposited, injected, 
dumped, spilled, leaked, or placed hazardous substances.26 But what of the 
case in which there was a passive migration of a substance from one 
property to another property, even in the face of state-of-the-art methods of 
containment? What is the chain of causation for passive migration and does 
“migration” fall neatly under the seven proscribed actions?  
Carson Harbor Village Mobile Home Park v. UNOCAL presented an 
example of passive migration of underground oil sludge from a refinery to 
a mobile home park.27 Added to the liability question there was a problem 
of agency, which we discuss next, as the owners of the refinery and the 
mobile home park changed while the migration took place unnoticed under 
their feet.28 With logic similar to the sine qua non test, and despite the 
“logical cul-de-sacs” in the law and the “baffling language” Congress used, 
the Ninth Circuit, acting en banc and relying on a “plain-meaning 
interpretation of disposal,” ruled that UNOCAL was liable.29 
Human beings have a concept of an individual agent—typically a 
person or some natural object—but we also typically extend that notion to 
attribute agency to groups, collectives, institutions, governments, 
 
 22. About Agency, DEL. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last 
updated Mar. 24, 2013). 
 23. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 24. CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–
9675 (2006)); Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 880 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 25. Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 890–91. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 9607. 
 27. Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 868. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 883–84. 
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administrations, and so forth. For example, we think of collective will and 
agency when we talk of the intent of the framers,30 legislative intent or will, 
or the Bush administration. In 1993, Congress passed, and President 
Clinton signed, a joint “Apology Resolution” regarding the overthrow of 
the Hawaiian Kingdom before the acquisition of the territory of Hawaii by 
the United States.31 None of the people responsible or affected by the 
acquisition were still living, but the agents—the government of the United 
States and the counterfactual sovereigns of Hawaii—were the active 
parties. 
In what follows, we pick up where H.L.A. Hart left off in his famous 
thesis in The Concept of Law. Hart was “concerned with the clarification of 
the general framework of legal thought,”32 as are we. In the Part II, we will 
discuss ways in which human beings manage to think at vast scope across 
time, space, causation, and agency. They do so by creating compressed, 
portable “mental blends” and using them as the basis for vast ideas. In Part 
III, we give examples of how we compress vast legal concepts into 
concepts that we can use in the here and now. In Part IV, we offer some 
examples and experimental evidence that start to put boundaries on how 
well humans can undertake the compression and expansion processes 
needed to understand the compressions of vast concepts and the expansions 
from those back out into something vast and untouchable. In this part, we 
also present a research program to help us define the limits of human 
compression of vast concepts into concepts we can use in the here and now. 
In Part V, we discuss intellectual property, a highly topical area of law in 
which the compressions and expansions are still up for debate, and in 
which the very ground rules by which we will understand and debate the 
topic are still up for grabs. The concept of intellectual property is a blend: 
creating this blend draws on our idea of property law, but it draws on many 
other ideas, too. The way in which we draw on ideas to form the blend of 
intellectual property and the new features that arise just for this blend are 
very hotly disputed. We will review key elements of the debate about this 
blend. In Part VI, we draw some conclusions and define a research program 
for investigating how blending can go right in the law—to make strong, 
flexible, useful, and portable concepts of law—and also how blending can 
go wrong in the law. 
 
 30. HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED 
QUESTION 113 (1994). 
 31. S.J. Res. 19, 103d Cong. (1993) (enacted).  
 32. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, at vi (3d ed. 2012). 
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II.  COMMON COMPRESSIONS OF TIME, SPACE, CAUSATION 
AND AGENCY 
It is not surprising that human beings are often very poor at thought 
that ranges across time, space, causation, and agency. All thought is 
nothing but here-and-now biological processes under present conditions. 
Necessarily, that is all the organism has to work with. As Sir Charles 
Sherrington expressed almost three-quarters of a century ago, the brain and 
the central nervous system are an “enchanted loom” where “millions of 
flashing shuttles weave a dissolving pattern, always a meaningful pattern, 
though never an abiding one.”33 Memory does not produce an intersection 
of past times and the present moment, although it seems to us that it does. 
Our memories are not like a video camera, or Apple’s backup system 
“Time Machine”;34 we cannot scroll from instance to instance, through our 
memories, back and forth, willy-nilly as suits us—far from it. Thought in 
its processes cannot stretch far over time, space, causation, or agency. 
Biologically, the reach of thinking is tiny. 
But in its content, human thought goes very far. It is not just that we 
can have an individual memory of another time or place—for example, a 
waterfall we once saw while hiking—but that we can have concepts that 
stretch across and apply to vast ranges of time, space, causation, and 
agency that go utterly beyond any possible individual perception or 
memory. We can have ideas like “nation,” “marriage,” and “urban 
renewal.” Somehow, present biology must be exploited into manufacturing 
present thought whose content is taken to be very expansive. This is a 
startling mismatch between production and result. Naturally, this mismatch 
produces difficulty, error, and failure. 
The difficulties that arise from trying to use present biology to 
produce expansive ideas have to some extent been studied. The 
experimental record on our standard biases (of which the literature has 
produced a list of nearly four dozen so far) and failures is so well known 
and robust that there are commercial packages for presenting tutorials 
(including videos) to be used by companies who need to train security 
officers, guards, police, and, in general, supervisors.35 The purpose of these 
 
 33. CHARLES SCOTT SHERRINGTON, MAN ON HIS NATURE 225 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 
2009) (1940). 
 34. See Mac Basics: Time Machine, APPLE CO., http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1427 (last 
modified Nov. 16, 2012). 
 35. E.g., DVDs that Reveal the Surprising Limits of Perception, Attention, and Awareness, 
VISCOG PRODS., INC., http://www.viscog.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
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packages is to convince viewers that what they think about thinking is often 
wrong and that the biases and failures of thought are incorrigible per se.36 
We can learn that we have these deficiencies and we can develop routines 
to compensate for these incorrigible deficiencies. Human beings, for 
example, have very selective attention37 and memory.38 They are largely 
blind to change in their environments.39 They attribute elements to reality 
that is constructed mentally, such as color constancy40 and pain.41 They 
routinely engage in reconstructive memory.42 Their perceptions change 
depending on their intentions to act.43 In many ways, we are poor 
witnesses, despite the fact that we usually feel that we are very good 
witnesses.44 
The basic questions are inevitable: How can there be law, which is 
concerned entirely with concepts that stretch expansively over great ranges 
of time, space, causation, and agency, if human brains cannot in their 
biologically processes directly stretch over time, space, causation, and 
agency? Given the inevitable mismatch between human brains and law, and 
the consequent struggle to fit one to the other, what techniques are 
available to improve the fit? We will begin to answer these questions by 
examining an everyday example drawn from outside the law. 
A.  AN EXAMPLE OF A COMPRESSED BLEND: THE CYCLIC DAY 
Let us consider the cyclic day. In our experience, there is actually just 
 
 36. See id. 
 37. See, e.g., ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN 
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 29–30 (1998); Michael I. Posner & Steven E. Petersen, 
The Attention System of the Human Brain, 13 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 25, 38 (1990). 
 38. See, e.g., PATRICIA S. CHURCHLAND & TERRENCE J. SEJNOWSKI, THE COMPUTATIONAL 
BRAIN 240–44 (1994). 
 39. See, e.g., Daniel T. Levin & Daniel J. Simons, Failure to Detect Changes to Attended 
Objects in Motion Pictures, 4 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 501, 501–06 (1997) (describing studies that 
show “observers are surprisingly slow and often fail to detect changes to successive views of both 
natural and artificial scenes”). 
 40. See, e.g., DAVID H. HUBEL, EYE, BRAIN, AND VISION 183 (1995).  
 41. E.g., V.S. RAMACHANDRAN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, PHANTOMS IN THE BRAIN: PROBING 
THE MYSTERIES OF THE HUMAN MIND 22 (1998). 
 42. See, e.g., F.C. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 263–66 (1932) (explaining how a narrator might reconstruct a story based on his position 
within a group, and his relationship with the group). 
 43. E.g., Peter M. Vishton et al., Planning to Reach for an Object Changes How the Reacher 
Perceives It, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 713, 713–19 (2007) (describing studies demonstrating that a person’s 
perception of distance to an object changes when intending to reach for the object). 
 44. See Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Role of the Social Sciences in Preventing Wrongful 
Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1271, 1275–77 (2005) (“[E]xtensive scientific research establishes 
that high confidence on the part of an eyewitness does not directly correlate with high accuracy.”).  
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one day and then another day and then another day until we die. The days 
as we live them are all quite different. They do not repeat. If we woke up 
today and it was exactly the same as yesterday because it was in fact the 
same day in every detail, we would be sure we had lost our minds. Day 
after day after day indefinitely, with all those differences between days, is 
far too much to comprehend; too much to actually remember or imagine; 
too much to carry around and manage. It is not portable. It is not human 
scale. 
As Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner discuss, it is obvious that we 
blend these different days into a conception of a cyclic day.45 We do so by 
using one of many general templates for creating blends. 
 
FIGURE 1.  The Cyclic Day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: This figure is taken from FAUCONNIER & TURNER, supra note 45, at 197 fig.10.1. 
There are analogies and disanalogies across different days in our 
experience. The analogies are packed to one thing in the blend: the day. 
The disanalogies are packed to change for that thing: the day starts over 
every dawn and repeats. This general mental pattern of compressing 
analogical connections to one thing and disanalogical connections to 
change for that one thing is the general template at work here. It is used 
very widely across human cognition. Note that the result—the cyclic day—
is not just an abstraction. There is new meaning, “emergent structure,” in 
 
 45. GILLES FAUCONNIER & MARK TURNER, THE WAY WE THINK: CONCEPTUAL BLENDING AND 
THE MIND’S HIDDEN COMPLEXITIES 195–97 (2002). 
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the blend that is not in any of the individual input days.46 No one of these 
individual input days repeats or starts over. All the days that have ever 
happened or will happen can be blended into a single unit—the cyclic day, 
which repeats.47 Thinking of the cyclic day, we can say, “Dawn is coming 
around again,” or “It is time for my morning coffee,” or “This park closes 
at dusk.”48 We know how these words and concepts apply to the blend, and 
we can expand from the blend to anything in the string of days that 
interests us. The cyclic day is a small, congenial blend for thinking about 
the vast sequence of days, a sequence itself too big to hold in mind all at 
once. This blend makes it possible for us to work with concepts of time that 
stretch across vast ranges of ideas that we would otherwise be able to 
manage. 
B.  ELEMENTS OF BLENDING 
There are several questions we are addressing here: How do new 
concepts for law arise? How does new law arise? How do new ideas of law 
arise which human beings in a society can actually command, understand, 
and deploy? 
One idea provided by cognitive science for the origin of new ideas is 
that we create new frames, schemata, or general notions, by creating 
abstractions of what we have encountered. David Rumelhart gives a 
summary of the history of the notion of this sort of schema and provides a 
summary of the work of Rumelhart, Norman, and Ortony.49 Martin gives a 
fuller summary.50 In this view, a conceptual schema, abstraction, or 
generalization, offers compressions of regularities in experience, guides 
future interaction, undergoes adjustment as we have further experience, and 
is subject to selection pressures. 
Rumelhart analyzes three ways in which new meaning can arise (he 
calls this “learning”).51 All three ways involve conceptual schemata. First, 
there is accretion: learning happens when we lay down a memory of an 
 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 195–96. 
 48. Id. at 196. 
 49. See generally David E. Rumelhart, Schemata: The Building Blocks of Cognition, in 
THEORETICAL ISSUES IN READING COMPREHENSION: PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, 
LINGUISTICS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND EDUCATION 33 (Rand J. Spiro, Bertram C. Bruce & 
William F. Brewer eds., 1980). 
 50. See generally Ben Martin, The Schema, in COMPLEXITY: METAHPORS, MODELS, AND 
REALITY 263 (George A. Cowan, David Pines & David Melzer eds., 1999) (reviewing the history of 
schemata starting from the works of Aristotle and Plato through to the present). 
 51. Rumelhart, supra note 50, at 52. 
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experience as an instantiation of existing schemata.52 For example, if we 
have a schema for “restaurant” and visit a new one, then we have a memory 
of the new restaurant; we remember it as an experience that conformed to 
the schema restaurant. Second, there is tuning: we slightly adjust an 
existing schema to make it match experience better.53 For example, under 
inflation over years, we might slightly adjust our notion now and then of 
how much a dinner in a good restaurant should cost. Accretion and tuning, 
Rumelhart notes, do not lead to new schemata.54 So they offer very little in 
the way of explaining the invention of new schemata.55 Third, there is 
restructuring, of two kinds: patterned generation and schema induction.56 
Patterned generation happens infrequently and schema induction almost 
never.57 Patterned generation is the construction of a new schema by 
making a slight change in an old one, where the possibilities for change are 
few: a constant can be replaced with a variable, a variable can be replaced 
with a constant, and so forth, as motivated by new experience.58 For 
example, we may have begun with a frame for “restaurant” in which the 
maître d’ is male, but, under experience, have come to change that constant 
into a variable: male or female. The second kind of restructuring is schema 
induction, which is the process of making a new schema that is simply the 
conjunction of old schemata.59 So if we always follow dinner at the 
restaurant with a walk through the park to take coffee at a café, we may 
develop a “dinner-walk-coffee” schema. 
The theory of conceptual schemata is useful for explaining how the 
making of meaning exhibits regularity. In fact, under the theory of 
conceptual schemata, regularity is inevitable. But the notion of a 
conceptual schema is nearly useless for explaining how a new schema can 
arise before it is manifest in our regular experience. Most of our ideas arise 
in our minds before they have referents in the world. It is fine to imagine 
that if we visit many restaurants, we acquire a compressed generalization of 
what happens in a restaurant. But this gives no explanation of how the idea 
of a restaurant was invented in the first place. 
Just so, in the law, if we encounter very many rulings on property 
rights, for example, we might form a compressed notion of property. But 
 
 52. Id. at 52–53. 
 53. Id. at 53–54. 
 54. Id. at 54. 
 55. See id.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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this provides no explanation of how those notions of property and rights 
arose in the first place. 
Here, we are discussing how new concepts of law can arise, and the 
principles according to which useful versus failed concepts in law arise. 
Our proposal is that when we try to create new concepts of law, we do not 
merely compress, abstract, or analogize, but instead blend to create new 
emergent structure in the blend that is useful because it is mentally 
tractable, and can be carried within our mental competence and expanded 
as needed to think about particular situations.  
That last paragraph is a mouthful of jargon, so let us cash it out here. 
Suppose we are actually thinking of the real world. In particular, we are 
thinking of “my brother-in-law, the stockbroker.” In cognitive science, one 
would say that we are activating a “mental space.” A mental space is a 
small array of related mental elements that one can activate simultaneously 
in the mind. In this case, “My brother-in-law, the stockbroker” prompts us 
to activate a mental space with the elements: one man (I, who is the 
speaker); another man A, the role stockbroker; a role-value connection 
from the role stockbroker to the value A; and a relation of brother-in-law 
between I and A. In cognitive science, such a mental space is usually 
represented as a circle with elements and relations within it, as shown in 
figure 2. 
 
FIGURE 2.  A Diagram of a Mental Space 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mental spaces exist in “mental webs.” A mental web60 is a set of 
mental spaces that are activated and connected as one is thinking about a 
topic. Consider the following statement as an example: “My brother-in-law, 
the stockbroker, will be traveling from San Francisco to Cleveland for 
 
 60. Alternatively, it is called a mental network, or conceptual network. Many other metaphors 
are available, each with its own deficits. 
 
 
• • 
• 
• 
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Thanksgiving for a massive family reunion, and we need to learn the time 
of his arrival so that we can go pick him up.” This statement will prompt 
for many mental spaces such as a mental space in which I locate my car 
keys; another in which I travel to my car; another in which I drive through 
no doubt complicated holiday traffic; another in which I stop at the arrival 
deck of Cleveland Hopkins airport at gate five; and on and on. Typically, 
one cannot hold all these spaces equally active simultaneously in the mind. 
We will focus on one or another mental space at a time, but activate many 
as we think, and those we have activated recently will remain latent, which 
is to say, easier to activate. 
The mental web will have many conceptual connections between the 
individual mental spaces in the web, the most frequent and important of 
which are the “vital relations.”61 Time, Space, Identity, Change, Cause-
Effect, Part-Whole, Representation, Analogy, Disanalogy, Representation, 
Property, Similarity, Category, Intentionality, and Uniqueness are the vital 
relations of a mental web.62 For example, in the mental web about my 
picking up my brother-in-law and family at the airport for the massive 
family reunion, there will be an agent in several of those mental spaces 
corresponding to I, and all of those elements in all of those mental spaces 
will be connected by Identity connectors. These mental spaces in the 
mental web will be connected by many other connectors. The pickup at the 
airport is connected by a Time connector so that the pickup is suitably prior 
in time to the mental space in which we all have the Thanksgiving feast. 
And that pickup at the airport is connected by a Space connector so that we 
understand that the airport is at a spatial remove from the house in which 
the Thanksgiving feast will be held in a vast dining room. Figure 3 shows 
such a mental web—it could and should, of course, be much, much larger. 
 
 
 
 
 61. See FAUCONNIER & TURNER, supra note 46, at 89–112 (discussing this phenomenon in a 
chapter entitled “Vital Compressions and Their Relations”). 
 62. Id. at xiii, 93. 
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FIGURE 3.  A Diagram of Part of a Mental Web 
But now comes the crucial step for new concepts: we can blend 
mental spaces in this mental web. A blend is a new mental space that 
results from blending constituent mental spaces in this mental web. The 
blend is not an abstraction, an analogy, or anything else already named and 
recognized in common sense, although blending is the basis of the 
cognitively modern human mind. A blend consists of a partial combination 
of elements from different mental spaces but develops a new conceptual 
structure of its own not drawn from those spaces.63 For example, “If I were 
a stockbroker, like my brother-in-law, who lives in San Francisco and so 
must rise every day the market is open at 5 a.m., I would be miserable” 
asks us to make a mental space in which there is one man (I) who is 
imbued with some of the speaker’s attributes and some of the brother-in-
law’s attributes, and for whom we develop a new structure. In the blend, 
there is an element that has the personal identity of the speaker, but no 
longer has that person’s job. This element is not available from any other 
space in the mental web. It is unique to the blend. This element is 
“emergent” in the blend. There are many other elements and properties in 
the blend that are not available from other spaces in the mental web (or 
network, or whatever metaphor one prefers for a set of connected ideas). 
Neither the speaker nor the brother-in-law is miserable in the mental spaces 
that are blended, but in the blend, the person is miserable. This is new in 
the blend. The mental spaces in the mental web that contribute to the 
creation of the blend are called by a number of names: inputs, contributors, 
donors, and so forth. All of these metaphoric names have their own 
 
 63. For a more detailed discussion, see generally id. 
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communicative deficits. Figure 4 shows the blend. 
 
FIGURE 4.  A Diagram of Blending 
The elements and relations that come into the blend from the mental 
spaces that are blended are referred to as “projections.”64 These projections 
to a blend are always “partial” or rather “selective.”65 For example, in “If I 
were a stockbroker, like my brother-in-law, who lives in San Francisco and 
so must rise every day the market is open at 5 a.m., I would be miserable,” 
we project to the blend the speaker but only a small part of what we know 
about the speaker. We do not project the speaker’s current employment, for 
example, because then the speaker could not be a stockbroker. We project 
from the mental space with the stockbroker brother-in-law the role 
stockbroker and perhaps even “living in San Francisco and accordingly 
rising every weekday at 5 a.m.,” but not of course the physical appearance 
of the brother-in-law, or his family relations, and so forth. We might 
project his lodging, but we might not, and this variation illustrates the fact 
that what we project to the blend as we build it is largely left up to the 
different members of the communicative scene. Disagreements and 
misunderstandings naturally arise. Blends are sometimes hotly contested in 
a culture, as we see in the current turmoil over how to conceive of the 
blend “intellectual property.”66 
In the blend, the speaker is a stockbroker and is miserable. In no other 
space is any of this true. This structure is emergent in the blend. It arises as 
 
 64. See generally id. (discussing projections and blends). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See infra Part V. 
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a consequence of making the blend.67 Crucially, there is also new emergent 
structure in the web outside of the blend. Now we know, for example, that 
the speaker in his own reality has an aversion to rising early. This is new 
structure we build for the speaker in his own reality that we did not have 
there before. We build it for the speaker as a consequence of what we have 
learned by building the blend. There is also emergent structure in the 
connection between the speaker in his input mental space and the 
stockbroker in his input mental space, namely a Disanalogy connection 
between them. Of course, there always were disanalogies between them in 
the mental web: the brother-in-law lived in San Francisco but the speaker 
presumably lived somewhere else, like Cleveland; the brother-in-law was a 
stockbroker but presumably the speaker was not; and so forth. But now 
there is a new, emergent Disanalogy connection between these spaces 
having to do with disposition. It could have been different, and would have 
been if the sentence had been, “If I were a stockbroker, like my brother-in-
law, who lives in San Francisco and so must rise every day the market is 
open at 5 a.m., I would be happy.” When we project what we have learned 
in the blend back to original mental spaces in the mental web, we do not 
always project exactly what has arisen in the blend. 
Some bundles of thought are tractable and manageable by the human 
mind; these we call “human-scale” bundles.68 Other bundles of thought are 
not tractable, because we cannot grasp them mentally, or they go beyond 
our mental limits. Most mental webs for what we must think through would 
be utterly intractable for us were it not that we can make a human-scale 
blend drawing on different mental spaces in the web. The blend then gives 
us a tractable thing to think about. It helps us access, organize, manipulate, 
and adjust the mental web in which it now sits.69 For example, in the vast 
mental web of thinking about life and possibilities, I can have a little blend 
in which I actually am a stockbroker, going through the motions. The blend 
in this case is a kind of human-scale mental simulation. 
A blend is a “compression” of the mental state it serves. It is not a 
small abstraction of the mental spaces it blends and is not a partial cut-and-
paste assembly either, because it contains emergent structure.70 It is a 
compact idea containing much less information than is contained in the 
 
 67. There are many kinds of emergent structure discussed by Fauconnier and Turner, and 
elsewhere. For example, emergent structures from “composition,” “completion,” and “running the 
blend.” See, e.g., FAUCONNIER & TURNER, supra note 46, at 47–48. 
 68. See id. at xvi (discussing blends at “human conceptual scale”). 
 69. See id. at xvi, 30.  
 70. For examples and further discussion of emergent structures, see generally id.  
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mental web it serves, and in particular it is a compression from which we 
can access the rest of the mental web in which it sits. 
We “expand” tractable blends to help us think about larger mental 
webs, or mental networks. We might say, metaphorically, that we carry 
small, compressed blends with us mentally, and unpack or expand them as 
needed to connect up to what we need to think about.
71
 For example, the 
pithy, compressed little blend with the miserable stockbroker can be used 
to help the speaker think about any job in a time zone other than the 
Eastern Time Zone (GMT - 5) and help him be vigilant about inquiring into 
demands that any job might impose because of events that lie outside its 
time zone. 
This example about the stockbroker is provided to furnish some 
vocabulary, but it is crucial not to over-generalize from it. Although this 
example is obvious as a blend, essentially all blending is invisible to 
consciousness and does not look at first like blending. The counterfactual 
“If I were . . .” is only one very tiny example of a linguistic prompt for 
blending, and many other kinds of products arise from the operations of 
blending. Blends need not be counterfactual, hypothetical, false, or 
fictional. On the contrary, many blends constitute what we feel in common 
sense to be ground truth. Although a great deal of new thought is not 
directly tied to the world—abstract mathematics, fiction, fantasy, and so 
forth—nonetheless a great deal of new thought is indeed tied to the world, 
as in law. What is new in the thought arises from making a compressed 
blend of what we know of the world, a blend whose construction brings 
about new thought in the blend and in the mental web it serves. This new, 
emergent structure in the blend gives us a way of capturing, managing, and 
developing that mental web. Figure 5 shows a suggestive cartoon of this 
process. 
 
 
 
 
 71. See id. at 210, 213, 333, 339. 
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FIGURE 5.  A Diagram of Blending in a Mental Web 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can give a quick diagram illustrating all these—mental space, 
mental web, connectors between spaces, emergent structure, projection, 
compression, expansion, human-scale blend. It is a diagram from 
Fauconnier and Turner.72 Consider the riddle of the Buddhist Monk: 
 A Buddhist monk begins at dawn one day walking up a mountain, 
reaches the top at sunset, meditates at the top for several days until one 
dawn when he begins to walk back to the foot of the mountain, which he 
reaches at sunset. Make no assumptions about his starting or stopping or 
about his pace during the trips. Riddle: Is there a place on the path, 
which the monk occupies at the same hour of the day on the two separate 
journeys?73 
One way to solve this riddle is to blend the monk’s ascent with the 
monk’s descent, so that in the blend, at dawn, there are two monks, one at 
the foot of the mountain, the other at the top. They then take their journeys, 
each arriving at the opposite end of the path at sunset. They must meet 
somewhere, and where they meet is the spot on the path that they occupy at 
the same hour of the day on the two separate journeys, as shown in figure 
6. 
 
 72. Id. at 39. 
 73. Id. 
 
 
 
 
 
• 
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FIGURE 6.  Blending to Solve the Riddle of the Buddhist Monk 
Source: This figure is a simplified version of a figure taken from FAUCONNIER & TURNER, supra note 
45, at 45 fig.3.5. 
The connected set of ideas for solving this riddle is a mental web. It 
contains at least three mental spaces.74 There are connectors between 
mental spaces, such as Identity connectors between the path in the mental 
space for the ascent and the path in the mental space for the descent. Some 
but not all the information from those two mental spaces is projected to a 
blended mental space.75 We do not, for example, project the date of the 
ascent and the date of the descent, or the weather on those days, or the fact 
that the monk is aware of what is around him and would surely be shocked 
to find himself approaching himself on the path. We do not project the fact 
that a person cannot be in two places (foot and summit) at the same time. 
The blend is a compression of parts of its mental web, and it is at human 
scale because it is a little vignette about two people approaching each other 
on a path; this is a simple and familiar scene of human walking.76 But this 
compressed blend also has emergent structure.77 It has two monks, and a 
meeting. We can use the compressed blend to think about and work on the 
mental web. We can expand or unpack the blend and connect it back up to 
elements in the larger mental web. Some of the emergent structure in the 
blend, namely, the fact that there is a meeting, leads us to project back to 
 
 74. Id. at 40–42. 
 75. Id. at 47. 
 76. Id. at 48. 
 77. Id. 
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create new structure in the mental web itself: now, for example, there is an 
Identity connection between some spot on the path in the ascent mental 
space and a spot on the path in the descent mental space such that the monk 
is located at that spot in his travel at the same time of day on the two 
separate days. 
In what follows, we will propose that new concepts in law result from 
blending to create new emergent structure in the blend that can be used to 
organize vast mental conceptions, which would otherwise lie beyond our 
mental powers of invention and understanding. 
C.  HOW TO BRIDGE THE MISMATCH BETWEEN LIMITED HUMAN BRAINS 
AND VAST LEGAL THOUGHTS 
Perhaps the most obvious and familiar example of a compression is a 
map, of the kind we hold in our hand or the kind we hold in our head. In 
figure 7, we reproduce the map of the Washington D.C. Metro system. A 
map of a metro rail system, for example, compresses all the space over the 
entire city into one snapshot at human scale, something small enough to 
hold in the mind’s eye. A great deal of detail in this geographical space is 
dropped out. Instead, we have in the mental map that there are five rail 
lines which intersect. We do not care much about accuracy of path from 
any station to another, but rather only about connectivity. All the time it 
takes to travel is also compressed down to the time it takes for our mind’s 
eye to scan along the compressed, zoomed-out rail line from one station to 
another. All the causation is compressed to a few simple causal steps: we 
board the train and it carries us from one station to another. All the agency 
in the metro rail system is compressed to one agent: the train. We say, “The 
train will take you from Virginia Square to the Capitol Building.” 
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FIGURE 7.  Map for Washington, D.C. Metro, 2012 
Source: This figure is from System Map, WASH. METRO. AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
http://www.wmata.com/rail/docs/colormap_lettersize.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
Mentally, to think about making a trip on the metro rail, we do not 
need to call up even the entire map, much less all the information that we 
happen to know about Washington D.C. but that is not coded in any way on 
the map, such as elevation, weather, pleasantness of neighborhoods, and so 
forth. Instead, we can start from the compressed, very partial knowledge 
that there are five lines which intersect. We expand our little notions only 
as much as we need to solve the problem that we face. Suppose we want to 
know how to get to the Capitol Building from Arlington. We would need to 
be able to activate enough of the map—perhaps with the use of inference 
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from memory—to activate the idea that they are both on the orange line. So 
all we need to do is get to the metro station near Arlington, get on the train 
going east, and get off at the Capitol Building. We do not need to carry the 
vast idea of the landscape of Washington D.C. with us. On the contrary, we 
can expand just the elements we need from our compressed map of five 
intersecting rail lines. 
The vast mental network we assemble with the help of expansions 
from our mental map of the metro will include many things that are not 
coded in the map: whether we have enough time available for the trip; how 
tired, weak, or strong we are for the trip; whether we can get a reasonable 
bite to eat along the way; whether our friend can join us as we make our 
trip; and so forth. These things and much more may be crucial as we build 
the mental network of vast scope, and the little compressed blend of the 
map helps us build that network. The law, as we will show, is similar: we 
have compressed, portable blends for law that provide tractable, human-
scale concepts that we can then expand as needed to help us think at great 
scope. 
Mental networks with vast extent of time, space, causation, and 
agency can be provided with compressed blends. Much like the D.C. Metro 
System Map in figure 7, these compressed blends, if successful, will allow 
us to hold vast thoughts at human scale in the here and now. Here, we 
present what we think is the crucial mental operation needed for vast 
thought. It is the operation we use to manufacture compressed blends that 
can be used to generate, access, and manipulate parts of a much bigger 
mental network. A useful compressed blend is one that, cognitively, fits 
relatively well inside our limited thinking. It is used as a key, a gnomon, 
and a generator for the complex network. 
III.  EXAMPLES OF COMPRESSED BLENDS IN LAW 
Consider the idea in U.S. constitutional law of a “person.” The 
concept of a person is one of the most congenial concepts for human 
thought. There is a particular compressed blend in law that uses the concept 
of a person as one of its inputs. But the blend has many other inputs, and 
we project only some of the information from each of these inputs to the 
blend, and the blend develops some structure of its own. This blend 
constitutes a legal person, and it does not apply to a human being. There is 
an entity in the blend that is a kind of person, a blended person, a legal 
person. But a legal person does not have to be an individual, for example. 
Various other kinds of information that stretch over time, space, causation, 
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and agency are projected into this blend. In the blend, a corporation, 
church, or charity can be a person.78 One of the most central features of a 
person—that it must die within a canonical span of years—is not in the 
blend: a blended legal person can be hundreds of years old. The University 
of Southern California, the Vatican, and the Guggenheim Foundation are 
all blended legal persons. This blend is congenial because it fits the 
limitations of the human mind. We can expand this blend to access, 
manipulate, and consider ranges of information in a vast mental network of 
concepts that would otherwise not fit the human mind. The blend is a stable 
mental platform on which we can stand to reach up to things in the vast 
mental network that would otherwise elude us. 
This blend is very well established in law. From Woodward,79 to 
Santa Clara County,80 to Citizens United,81 the U.S. Supreme Court has 
routinely ruled that specific constitutional rights that protect persons also 
protect legal persons, such as corporations and other organizations.82 The 
Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state to deny any person within its 
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.83 Using the legal person blend, 
this provision applies to corporations. First Amendment rights apply to all 
legal persons. For example, Congress may not make a law restricting the 
free speech of a group, a church, a political organization, or a corporation.84 
On the basis of the legal person blend, the due process clause proscribes a 
state government’s taking of a corporation’s property without either due 
process or just compensation.85 
The blend has emergent structure that is not originally in any of the 
inputs, but we project it back to the inputs, changing our ideas about them. 
In the inputs, a person is an individual with constitutional protections, and a 
corporation is a group. But in the blend, the corporation has protections it 
would not otherwise have, and we project those protections back to the 
input corporation. 
 
 78. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882–83 (2010) (applying First Amendment 
protections to corporations); Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (including 
corporations as protected “persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 613–14 (1819) (expanding rights to chartered corporations). 
 79. Woodward, 17 U.S. at 613–14. 
 80. Santa Clara Cnty., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, which forbids a state to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws applies to corporations.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 882–83. 
 82. See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text. 
 83. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 882–84. 
 84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 
 85. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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Of course, it is in the nature of compressed blends that they do not 
include everything from the inputs. The projection to the blend from the 
inputs is selective, and emergent structure arises in the blend that is not in 
any of the inputs. For example, the blend does not include personal privacy 
rights. In FCC v. AT & T Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously 
that the Freedom of Information Act’s definition of person, which of course 
now includes corporations, does not thereby extend the right of a “personal 
privacy” exemption to corporations.86 On the other hand, in Citizens 
United, the Court, using the legal-person blend, ruled 5-4 that when 
corporations or unions pay for political ads, First Amendment protections 
apply to them.87 Justice Stevens, dissenting, writes, 
 It might also be added that corporations have no consciences, no 
beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help structure 
and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their 
“personhood” often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not 
themselves members of “We the People” by whom and for whom our 
Constitution was established.88 
The Court in 2012 reaffirmed its ruling in Citizens United in 
overturning a Montana statute: 
A Montana state law provides that a ‘corporation may not make . . . an 
expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that 
supports or opposes a candidate or a political party.’ . . . [T]his Court 
struck down a similar federal law, holding that “political speech does not 
lose First Amendment protection simply because its source is a 
corporation.” The question presented in this case is whether the holding 
of Citizens United applies to the Montana state law. There can be no 
serious doubt that it does.89 
The blended concept of a legal person can, however, be manipulated 
and adjusted. The compression is not static. Indeed, much of legal 
reasoning consists of arguing over what goes into the blend, what new 
structure it develops, and how it is to be expanded out to apply to specific 
cases and other ranges of information. Courts can refine or clarify just what 
elements are to be projected from the inputs to the compressed blend, and 
 
 86. FCC v. AT & T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1178 (2011). 
 87. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 882–83. The First Amendment reads, “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 88. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 89. Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam) (citations 
omitted). 
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how the compressed blend is to be expanded as we try to work with the 
network. 
Property assessments, for example, are commonplace across the 
United States and elsewhere. Assessments are used to fund, among other 
things, transportation systems, sidewalks, parks, parkways, recreational 
areas, sanitary sewers, drainage systems, street lighting, fire protection 
systems, flood protection, geologic hazard abatement or prevention, water 
and gas supply systems, retaining walls, ornamental vegetation, 
navigational facilities, and land stabilization. In 1996, Californians passed 
Proposition 218, governing the process by which assessments are 
enacted.90 According to California’s A Planner’s Guide to Financing 
Public Improvements, 
 Prior to creating an assessment district, the city, county, or special 
district must hold a public hearing and receive approval from a majority 
of the affected property owners casting a ballot. All owners of property 
within the assessment district must be mailed a detailed notice of public 
hearing and a ballot with which to voice their approval or disapproval of 
the proposed district at least 45 days prior to the hearing (Section 4(e), 
Article XIII D, California Constitution). The notice must contain: the 
total amount of money chargeable to the assessment district, the amount 
chargeable to each parcel in the district, the duration of the payments, the 
reason for the assessment, the basis upon which the proposed assessment 
was calculated, and a summary of the ballot procedure, as well as the 
date, time, and location of the public hearing. The notice must also 
disclose that a majority protest will result in the assessment not being 
imposed.91 
Among other constitutional rights in California, corporations may own 
property and thus, under California’s Proposition 218 and laws dating back 
nine decades, corporations may vote on ballot measures regarding 
assessments.92 Not only do assessment laws extend the franchise to 
corporations (without checking their citizenship or age, as brand new 
corporations headquartered out of state, or even out of the country, get to 
vote), but their votes are also in proportion to the benefit they are predicted 
to receive from the infrastructure to be funded by the assessment.93 So, in 
 
 90. Antero Rivasplata, Chapter 1: General Taxes, A PLANNER’S GUIDE TO FINANCING PUBLIC 
IMPROVEMENTS (June 1997), http://ceres.ca.gov/planning/financing/chap1.html#chap1. 
 91. Antero Rivasplata, Chapter 3: Special Assessments, A PLANNER’S GUIDE TO FINANCING 
PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS (June 1997),  http://ceres.ca.gov/planning/ financing/chap3.html#chap3. 
 92. Antero Rivasplata, Chapter 4: What Must A Local Government Do to Raise New Revenues, 
A PLANNER’S GUIDE TO FINANCING PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS (June 1997), http://ceres.ca.gov/planning/ 
financing/chap4.html#chap4; MARIANNE O’MALLEY, UNDERSTANDING PROPOSITION 218 (1996). 
 93. See Kogan & McCubbins, supra note 14, at 8.   
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creating the legal fiction of a corporation as a legal person in California and 
elsewhere, we violate both the one-man, one-vote ideal and the ideal of a 
private ballot. 
We see in these blends the creation of quasi-agents. Many different 
individual people may be involved, such as a firm’s shareholders, 
bondholders, lenders, suppliers, employees, and management. The vast 
mental network involved may indeed have agents in different locations, 
spread across space, and the individuals within this vast network may come 
and go, spread across time. We do not project down to the blend any of the 
biological realities of these human agents, such as birth, maturity, or indeed 
most of the things that Justice Stevens listed in his dissent to Citizens 
United.94 We do, however, project the ability to have intentions, interests, 
and ambitions to the single quasi-agent in the blend, so that the “owner” or 
the corporation now has aspects of mindedness. The quasi-agency in the 
blend is also imbued, in the case of assessment districts, with voting 
privileges and other central features of political agency, such as, most 
notably, the right to political speech under the First Amendment.95 
Of course, once we notice the compression of agency to create human-
scale agents, in cases like corporations and decedents, it becomes obvious 
that there are even more routine examples of agency compression, as in the 
blending of parent and child, so that the parent speaks for the child, and is 
in many ways responsible for the consequences of the child’s actions. 
Parents can be held liable if the child is truant from school, for example. 
Such agency compression is not exotic; it is routine in everyday life. 
In making these observations, we emphasize that our purpose in this 
Article is not at all to argue that such compressed blends in law always 
make for good law, good policy, accurate representation, superior society, 
or anything else that is thought valuable. Rather we seek to explain that 
because they fit the human mind, they can be used to ground legal thinking 
in ways that make law amenable to human thought. Fitting law that arches 
over time, space, causation, and agency to the human mind is difficult, and 
institutions of the law have labored to find solutions. 
Let us consider a second example of a compressed blend widely used 
in law. In Western legal systems, especially the United States, we often 
encounter the compressed blend of “adversarial jurisprudence.” More than 
two millennia ago, Aristotle analyzed the conceptual basis of our concept 
of jurisprudence. The foundation is force dynamics of the sort human 
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beings understand very well: two forces oppose each other. Two balanced 
opposing forces are in equilibrium. In Aristotle’s words, they are in 
“stasis.”96 Real-world arguments can be amazingly complicated in their 
reach over time, space, causation, and agency. But, as Dieter argues97 and 
Turner analyzes,98 this complexity can be anchored in a simple, force-
dynamic concept: an argument is constituted by a conflict of claims, where 
the claims are mapped onto opposed forces. 
There are the four major grounds on which stasis can be constituted.99 
One sort of ground concerns “Fact or Being,” also called “Existence or 
Conjecture” (“an sit”), as in the opposed claims, “You injured me!” versus 
“I didn’t do anything!” The second ground concerns “Definition” (“quid 
sit”) as in the opposed claims, “You injured me!” versus “What I did does 
not count as an injury!” This is the ground of interpretation, including legal 
interpretation of a statute. It is sometimes called the legal ground. The third 
ground concerns “Quality” (“quale sit”) as in the opposed claims, “You 
injured me!” versus “And a good thing too, since I did it to stop you from 
committing treason!” This is a ground of right versus wrong, and is 
sometimes called the juridical ground. The fourth and last ground concerns 
“Objection,” as in the opposing claims, “You injured me!” versus “This 
court is not the appropriate place to consider such a charge!”100 
How will the stasis be broken? How will one force overcome the 
other? This is where adjudication comes in. Adjudication is the breaking of 
the equilibrium. The result is a limited, compact, and force-dynamic 
situation, with a limited, dynamic resolution: there is equilibrium, and 
adjudication breaks it in one direction or the other. 
This gives judiciary action a basic narrative arc, of competing agents 
with competing, indeed diametrically opposed, goals. The competing 
agency makes competing roles in the story. In medieval Europe, the 
judiciary was sometimes reduced to one of the simplest forms of this 
competition, trial by combat, with the victor in combat being declared the 
victor in law.101 
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This basic narrative of adversarial jurisprudence, with limited roles 
and a familiar arc, is a special form of a cycle, that of a repeating contest. 
Two forces oppose to make a stasis, then two sides contest over which 
force will win. In trial by combat, the two agents are the deciding forces. In 
judicial proceedings, judges and juries are the deciding force. Two sides 
compete, one side wins. This happens every time the court comes to order, 
at least in principle. 
This is a brilliant compressed blend that produces a simple narrative of 
contest. Citizens can apply it, repeatedly, to any case. They use the blend to 
organize a vast mental network of information involving the specific case, 
a network that would otherwise be intractable to the mind. The result of 
using the blend to make sense of and work on that vast mental network 
often leads to deep misunderstanding of specifics, such as, for example, the 
difference between a trial court and an appellate court. But it provides a 
basis for generating an understanding of the complexity in the vast mental 
network. Those who are trained will expand the compressed blend to 
organize the mental network of information in ways regarded as more 
accurate than others. 
The power of this adversarial jurisprudence blend as an organizer of 
vast mental networks can be seen, for example, in its biblical use, where 
the entire history and condition of humankind is understood as anchored in 
this compressed blend: Humankind is the defendant; Satan is the accuser 
and prosecutor, before the judgment seat of God. Translations of Job, 
perhaps the oldest book of the Bible, typically translate ha-Satan, “The 
Satan,”     , with an expression that is the equivalent of “the accuser” or 
sometimes “the prosecutor.”102 
We see similar patterns of compression and expansion using the same 
blend of simple contest in the realms not of jurisprudence but of election 
and legislation. For example, election campaigns that span an entire 
continent, lasting for more than a year, involving tens of millions of people 
and hundreds of millions or billions of dollars, and in the case of the 
electoral college, arcane rules for deciding who wins, or in the case of 
primary elections, nominating conventions, debates, and decisions nested 
within other decisions, are ultimately compressed into a simple blend, 
typically akin to a horse race. Complicated matters of ideology, platforms, 
party registration, turnout, endorsements, and the like are absent from the 
blend. They are present in the vast mental network that the blend organizes, 
and we use the blend to help access and make sense of them, and to 
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manipulate parts of that conceptual network. The use of simple contest 
blends involving simple force dynamics of opposition and equilibrium is 
evident in the complicated way we conceive of a government based on 
checks and balances. 
One of the overarching difficulties in law, and perhaps the one of 
greatest magnitude, is that sometimes law has not yet produced, for a given 
part of law, a congenial and efficient compressed blend that all parties 
involved agree on and whose application they also agree on. Below is a 
general list of ways in which the great mental instrument of blending can 
fail to work in actual legal practice. After this list, we will discuss various 
cases and circumstances in law that illustrate these difficulties. The 
attempted blend may fail to fit the constitutive and governing principles for 
blending analyzed in Fauconnier and Turner.103 
(1) Blending is a basic mental operation running across all human 
cognition and subject to general structural requirements and constraints. 
Almost all of the work of blending is unconscious; very few of these 
blending attempts survive the constraints on the process; most of those that 
do attach to no purpose and so evaporate; and of the very few that survive 
the process, very few are ever detected in consciousness. Accordingly, 
blending can fail produce a good blend in many ways that are unrecognized 
by the thinker. 
(2) Mathematics, for example, illustrates how it can require centuries 
or millennia of familiarity with a domain before even enough compression 
occurs to make it possible for a blurry view of an interesting problem to 
begin to come into consciousness, and several more centuries before good 
compressions are achieved. 
(3) There may be conflicting candidate compressions. In such a 
condition, good and useful blends have been achieved and are widely 
available. Either can be used, but they are not compatible and can lead to 
opposed inferences. 
(4) Even for a strong, portable, compressed blend that is widely 
shared, there may be insufficient consensus on how that compressed blend 
is to be expanded to fit particular circumstances and situations. 
(5) People may have an existing, entrenched compressed blend that 
law cannot easily displace. Simply providing a mass of information is, 
cognitively, a weak strategy for displacing an entrenched, compressed 
blend. 
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For conflicting compressions, consider the “body politic” versus the 
“ship of state” as blends for thinking about the system of governance. 
Either can be used but they are not compatible and can lead to opposed 
inferences. In the ship-of-state blend, one can always get a new, improved 
skipper. But in the body-politic blend, decapitation is a bad idea. A topical 
example of conflicting compressions is “majority rule” versus “United 
States” for presidential elections. In the majority-rule blend, we have the 
structure of “one man, one vote,” summation of the votes, and victory for 
the majority. In the United States blend, it is fundamentally the states that 
are voting, and the District of Columbia was added to the crew, so there are 
fifty-one popular elections that send electors to the Electoral College for 
choosing the president. There are many strong arguments on either side, but 
the conflict is absolute, and accordingly, it is common to encounter 
absolute positions; for example, that the Electoral College is a brilliant 
mechanism that has saved the country from fraud and violence or that the 
Electoral College is indefensible in a democracy.104 There are so many 
complexities in expanding either of these compressed blends to think about 
actual presidential elections as to have resulted in a vast literature on the 
little-known details. 
For lack of consensus on how to expand and apply a strong and 
available compressed blend, consider the current turmoil over the status of 
“same-sex marriage.”105 Little in life can be as complicated as the reality of 
the billions of marriages that are in our world and in our history, but we 
have available a compressed blend for marriage and we do not feel that we 
have any difficulty in sharing that idea with others. Mostly, it can be 
activated, decompressed, and expanded to fit the great ranges of detail we 
encounter in thinking about actual marriages or categories of marriage. Of 
course, we all recognize some cases of shaky or uncertain application, 
cases in which what counts as marriage in one place does not count as 
marriage in another, of polygamy and polyandry, and so forth. But there is 
great controversy in law at the moment over whether and how to use this 
blend in applying to same-sex relationships.106 The arguments range across 
the full spectrum, from those on the ends who feel that it is simply obvious 
that the blend does or does not apply to that case, to those somewhere in 
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the middle who are laboriously working to modify the blend incrementally 
or to create other blends to handle the case. 
Such lack of consensus on expanding a blend is one of the most 
challenging areas of any legal system. If different individuals have quite 
different expansion schemes, then they cannot be assumed to know the 
same law or to be able to predict who will expand what legal statutes in 
what way. For example, notoriously, the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment offer only the most absolute compressed blends: “cruel and 
unusual punishment,”107 “due process of law,”108 and “equal protection.”109 
How to expand these notions is an overarching problem of our democracy. 
The expansion schemes must be widely shared if law is to count as a 
societal institution. Sharing the expansion scheme includes agreeing on the 
interpretive role of a particular institution and its warrant to deliberate over 
the appropriate expanding schemes. A strict constructionist prefers 
expansion schemes that operate in the context of those who framed the 
Constitution.110 Others contend that the expansion scheme should take 
place afresh in each generation, based on current contexts.111 
This difficulty of moving from the compressed blend to the vast 
mental network presents challenges in all walks of life, including the 
simple activity of telling time. The compressed blend of the cyclic day does 
not indicate what time zone one is in, or that times vary depending on 
geographical location. Accordingly, another compressed blend for time-
zone relation is needed, and it must be blended with the cyclic-day blend 
itself to deliver a more complicated hyperblend in which the cyclic day is at 
different times in different longitudes around the earth. And even worse, 
time zones are political creations—the Central European Time Zone 
includes everything from Corunna, Spain on the Atlantic Ocean to Hungary 
and Serbia. Places like Newfoundland and Bangalore, India are not even an 
integer number of hours away from Greenwich Mean Time.112 There is no 
compressed blend we can expand to give us time zone. 
To further complicate our notions of time, at various times of the 
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year—but not always the same day for all places—time shifts from 
standard to daylight-savings time. To prevent massive coordination 
failures, many organizations and machines expend considerable resources 
to get everyone to change the clock. There are household clocks and 
watches with hour and minute hands that receive radio signals from 
government sites that adjust them automatically. It is quite bizarre to see 
the clock move quickly when it is first plugged in, or when there is a shift 
between standard and daylight-savings time: the quick jumping of the clock 
does not fit our compressed blend for the cyclic day, and we must expand 
to the fuller network, probably with a chuckle, as we watch it. Coordinated 
Universal Time (“UTC”) was created for use in systems like computers that 
time-stamp events, so as to create stability, undisrupted by changes 
between standard and daylight-savings time, or changes from one 
geographical location to another.113 In any particular place or moment, the 
local population that hopes to interpret UTC needs to know the system of 
relationships between local timekeeping and UTC, but those who stay 
within UTC need no such additional transformations. Their compact cyclic 
day works just fine as it is. 
And of course, the cyclic-year compressed blend sometimes requires 
expert expansion to fit the realities. It turns out that packing time into 
cyclic years accurately is complicated and takes societal force. The 
problem is to make the cyclic year “start again” with the same kinds of 
conditions every time. If we kept our years at exactly 365 days, then after 
about 360 years, fall would replace summer. To use the word “replace” on 
the compact “cyclic-year” blend—there would of course be, outside of the 
blend, no “replacement” in the input years themselves—what we mean is 
that during the part of the twelve-month calendar that we associate with 
summer conditions, we would experience fall conditions. Winter would 
come very early indeed, and earlier and earlier each time. To force all this 
complexity into one packed cyclic year, we must assign to every fourth 
year in the sequence not 365 days but rather 366. We say we “add a day to 
February.” This is quite congenial to human thinking. We have coffee in 
front of us, and we add milk. It is a little changed. Now, in the blend, the 
year is like coffee. Instead of adding milk, we add a day. Of course, in the 
expanded network, no “day” is added: there is just one day and then 
another and so forth, and no new day gets inserted. But adding a leap day is 
not enough. Children learn, for example, that it is not the case that every 
fourth year is a leap year. Exceptions are years that end in 00, unless they 
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are exact multiples of 400. But almost no one except someone born on 
February 29 ever remembers which year is a leap year or knows when the 
next leap year will be. 
Luckily, in all these cases, we can hand the job over to instruments 
like clocks and calendars or personal digital assistants that are equipped 
with Internet connections to atomic clock and global-positioning systems. 
Because the problems are mainly just problems of coordination for 
efficiency, we have no hesitation to turning to the machines for the answer. 
But the case is quite different with law. Different compressed blends 
and different packing and expansion schemes result in different social 
realities, and these are often contested. Consider, for example, Shay’s 
Rebellion, in 1786 and 1787. It was driven in part by the conception that 
the rights of the federal government as given in the Articles of 
Confederation did not expand to include the mechanisms of tax and debt 
collection and government to which citizens in Massachusetts felt they 
were being subjected.114 
Constitutions raise many questions related to packing and expanding 
schemes in learning: Why do some constitutions work and others do not? 
More interesting, why does a constitution work in one place at one time 
and the same, or very similar, constitution fail to work in other places at 
other times? One answer is that constitutions are compressed blends for 
vast mental networks, and that in adopting them, there must be some sort of 
consensus about how these compressed blends are to be expanded. The 
American colonies, on winning their independence from England, adopted 
a constitution that was unanimously accepted by the colonial legislatures 
but was replaced—after only a decade of use—with the present 
Constitution.115 Yet, so well understood were the expansions of the ideas of 
confederation that they were readopted in the Confederate States 
Constitution some seventy years later116 and in the Charter for the United 
Nations some ninety years after that.117 Even so, confederations, wherever 
adopted, have proved to be relatively ungovernable.118 It cannot be that the 
countries themselves are ungovernable (after adopting the new 
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Constitution, for example, the U.S. government has been able to function, 
to write and enforce laws, to tax and spend, and so forth). 
There have been numerous explanations of why some constitutional 
forms succeed and others fail. One part of the answer, as we see in 
contrasting the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of the United 
States of America on the subject of taxation, is that the compressions found 
in some constitutional forms do not have well understood or accepted 
expansions, while other forms of governance do have compressions that are 
understood because they involve compressions with basic concepts that are 
widely understood. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 
Philadelphia in 1787 are often understood as having been influenced by the 
events of Shay’s Rebellion to strive for clearer and more widely accepted 
expansion schemes. In general, a culture can generate many different 
compressions and expansion schemes, and it is often the role of lawyers 
and legislators to argue about their status and desirability. 
Once law has achieved a new candidate blend, it can still be resisted 
because it is too weak to displace an existing, entrenched blend. The 
doctrine of contributory negligence was dominant for most of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but the Supreme Court of California 
overturned it in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California in favor of a doctrine of 
comparative negligence.119 One reason it gave for overturning the doctrine 
of contributory negligence was that juries did not understand or agree to 
it.120 Juries, contrary to the legal instructions offered by presiding judges, 
would often reach decisions that used a standard of comparative 
negligence, an already existing, entrenched compression.121 So, even 
though the legislature wanted to adopt and use one scheme for packing and 
expanding, and the courts tried for one hundred years to follow it, the 
people themselves refused to follow it, and the Supreme Court of 
California eventually recognized this impasse and changed the law.122 
Evidently, popular learning of the law and of all societal codes favors some 
kinds of compressed blends, despite the conflicting preferences of 
authorities. 
Our emphasis on blending and compression over time, space, agency, 
and causation in the development of concepts of law is offered as an 
improvement on the view that law is extended through analogy. Law 
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professors have long taught that statutory reasoning, the use of precedent in 
legal and regulatory decisions, and so forth, are applications of reasoning 
by analogy.123 This claim has echoes in cognitive science124 and 
pedagogy.125 Legal reasoning, it is taught, is based on expanding legal 
principles that are understood in one setting to new settings. But analogical 
reasoning in law often fails, and when it does succeed, the engine of 
success is not so much analogy but rather blending and compression to 
make new structures. It is actually well known that difficulties often arise 
in attempting to reason and argue analogically.126 Justice Scalia introduces 
the conception of the common law—and the casebook method of teaching 
it in the first year of law school—by recounting the famous case of Hadley 
v. Baxendale, “decided a century and a half ago by the English Court of 
Exchequer.”127 He walks sedulously through the ways in which, for this 
case and others, the supposed analogical extension from one case to 
another actually requires great creativity, including the making of new law 
that is not already decided.128 
In our terms, Hadley v. Baxendale makes a new compressed rule of 
law—that only reasonably foreseeable damages are recoverable.129 This 
rule is not contained in any of the input-contract cases on the basis of 
which the court was considering this new case. One could not map 
analogically from those very many previous cases—which stretched across 
time, space, causation, and agency—to deliver a resolution in the new case. 
Analogical mapping itself would have produced nothing. Moreover, there 
were many different ways, as Justice Scalia discusses, to arrange the 
mapping and the emergent compression in the blend. Legal reasoning often 
works on distinguishing a previous case, which is to say, of tinkering with 
the mappings between it and the present case. If a previous case can be 
distinguished, then the rule it established cannot be mapped directly to the 
 
 123. See, e.g., JOHN H. FARRAR, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL METHOD 63 (1977). 
 124. See KEVIN D. ASHLEY, MODELING LEGAL ARGUMENT: REASONING WITH CASES AND 
HYPOTHETICALS 207–11 (1990) (discussing case-based, analogical reasoning in artificial intelligence 
research). 
 125. See Peter Suber, Analogy Exercises for Teaching Legal Reasoning, 17 J.L. & EDUC. 91, 95–
98 (1988) (developing exercises that simulate legal reasoning to teach nonlawyers about legal reasoning 
and drawing analogies). 
 126. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 420 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that “on the most fundamental level, courts depend on political 
support” to produce reform, and pointing at the “disappointing results of attempts to use the courts to 
produce significant social reform” on issues such as civil rights, abortion, women’s rights, and the 
environment). 
 127. SCALIA, supra note 115, at 4–8. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ct. Exch.). 
  
552 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:517 
new case; rather, new compressions are required. Justice Scalia writes, 
Assume, for example, that a painter contracts with me to paint my house 
green and paints it instead a god-awful puce. And assume that not I, but 
my neighbor, sues the painter for this breach of contract. The court 
would dismiss the suit on the ground that (in legal terminology) there 
was no “privity of contract”: the contract was between the painter and 
me, not between the painter and my neighbor. Assume, however, a later 
case in which a company contracts with me to repair my home computer; 
it does a bad job, and as a consequence my wife loses valuable files she 
has stored in the computer. She sues the computer company. Now the 
broad rationale of the earlier case (no suit will lie where there is no 
privity of contract) would dictate dismissal of this complaint as well. But 
a good common-law lawyer would argue, and some good common-law 
judges have held, that that rationale does not extend to this new fact 
situation, in which the breach of a contract relating to something used in 
the home harms a family member, though not the one who made the 
contract. The earlier case, in other words, is “distinguishable.”130 
Reasoning by analogy in the law is—in the interesting cases in which 
new law is incrementally made—actually reasoning by blending and 
compression. A powerful example of why the notion of reasoning by 
analogy misses much of what law must do to fit the human mind is 
provided by Justice William O. Douglas’s invention of a policy expressed 
in his opinion in a 1954 case concerning the constitutionality of the Federal 
Urban Renewal Program in Washington, D.C.131 This ruling set policy and 
changed law on a truly grand scale in a contested arena. It altered the urban 
landscape and cost an enormous amount of money. Douglas needed to 
justify a policy according to which the federal government would be 
authorized to condemn and destroy entire urban areas, even though nearly 
all of the privately owned properties and buildings to be destroyed met the 
relevant legal codes, and most of those codes themselves were in fact 
individually unobjectionable. Douglas hit upon a new compressed blend: 
just as an entire crop, nearly all of whose individual plants are healthy, 
must be destroyed and entirely replanted when some small part of it is 
blighted, so an urban area, nearly all of whose individual buildings, 
utilities, and roads are satisfactory, must be completely destroyed and 
redesigned from scratch when it has become socially unsavory. The 
following paragraph suggests his reasoning: 
The experts concluded that if the community were to be healthy, if it 
were not to revert again to a blighted or slum area, as though possessed 
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of a congenital disease, the area must be planned as a whole. It was not 
enough, they believed, to remove existing buildings that were unsanitary 
or unsightly. It was important to redesign the whole area so as to 
eliminate the conditions that cause slums—the overcrowding of 
dwellings, the lack of parks, the lack of adequate streets and alleys, the 
absence of recreational areas, the lack of light and air, the presence of 
outmoded street patterns. It was believed that the piecemeal approach, 
the removal of individual structures that were offensive, would be only a 
palliative. The entire area needed redesigning so that a balanced, 
integrated plan could be developed for the region including not only new 
homes but also schools, churches, parks, streets, and shopping centers. In 
this way it was hoped that the cycle of decay of the area could be 
controlled and the birth of future slums prevented.132 
It might seem as if this invention of a justification for policy is the 
product of straightforward analogy: agricultural blight, a biological 
scenario, is mapped analogically onto urban distress, a social scenario. That 
analogy, if it worked, would already lead to a compressed blend. But 
actually, much more than mere analogical matching is going on in this 
cognitive circus. Suppose we were actually trying to match blight to urban 
condition, so as to select the strongest analogical match. To do that, we 
should look first for causal structure in blighted crops: there are organisms 
that inhabit the crop and that directly cause the problem. Are there 
organisms that inhabit the slum and that directly cause the problem? 
Certainly: the slum-dwellers. For the blighted crops, there is a solution: 
destroy the crop completely so as to destroy the organisms completely, and 
then replant the crop identically, so that it becomes exactly what it was 
before it was inhabited. Projecting this to slums, we have a straightforward 
solution: raze the slum areas entirely so as to kill all the residents, and then 
rebuild the area identically so that it becomes what it was before it was 
inhabited, with no residents. 
Of course, this analysis, when spelled out this way, is absolutely 
outrageous, and completely backward. Douglas began instead with distinct 
preferences in thinking about the slums: the residents must not be harmed, 
and even inconvenience to them must be attenuated; they are not to be 
stigmatized or viewed as the important cause of the problem, even though 
the causal chain must inevitably run through their actions; the federal 
government is to be viewed as responsible for correcting such problems; 
the extension of power to the federal government in its dealing with social 
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ills is desirable; and so forth.133 
Justice Douglas’s blend leads to emergent structure not contained in 
the input spaces in the vast mental network. For example, before this 
blending, the concept of urban distress does not by itself yield the policy of 
razing perfectly acceptable buildings and ripping up useful roads that are in 
good repair. In Douglas’s urban blight blend, the agents that cause blight 
are blended not with the biological agents in the area of urban distress but 
rather with the area itself. So in the blend, but in neither of the preexisting 
input spaces, the problem is handled by saving the resident organisms but 
razing the crop area. A summary of Douglas’s argument as “areas with 
slums are like crops with blight, so we should do to them what we do to the 
crops”134 misses the complicated conceptual work of blending in the 
invention of this policy. The purpose of this blend is to create new law and 
new inferences for the domain of urban conditions. 
Legal pedagogy also depends on fitting the human mind, in this case, 
the mind of the law student; compressed blends help us deal with selective 
attention and memory; and a powerful biological instrument for driving 
attention and memory is emotion. Neurological studies confirm that 
emotional tags markedly increase the likelihood of learning and memory, in 
a process often linked to amygdala function.135 The Paper Chase–style 
classroom,
136
 with its anxiety-producing interaction, may be a design 
feature of pedagogy dedicated to ensuring that the subject matter of the 
class remains active in the student’s brain while the daily process of 
managing vast networks by creating compressed blends goes forward. 
Pedagogy in law schools is an area of what might be called cognitive legal 
science—the cognitive scientific analysis of how the human mind deals 
with vast legal networks. 
Appropriate compressed blends make information memorable. Before 
printing, the limited availability of manuscripts and heavy reliance on 
memory created a bottleneck that only such compression could 
 
 133. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28–29, 32. 
 134. See id.  
 135. Mark G. Baxter & Elisabeth A. Murray, The Amygdala and Reward, 3 NATURE REVIEWS: 
NEUROSCIENCE 563, 563 (2002); Larry Cahill & James L. McGaugh, Mechanisms of Emotional 
Arousal and Lasting Declarative Memory, 21 TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCE 294, 297–98 (1998); Michela 
Gallagher & Geoffrey Schoenbaum, Functions of the Amygdala and Related Forebrain Areas in 
Attention and Cognition, 877 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 397, 397 (1999). See generally 3 STEVENS’ 
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING, MOTIVATION, AND EMOTION (Randy 
Gallistel & Hal Pashler eds., 3d ed. 2002) (providing comprehensive explanations of “key 
methodological concepts of experimental psychology”). 
 136. Referencing the classic film, THE PAPER CHASE (1973). 
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circumvent.137 The great triumph of compression in the law involved 
maxims. These compressed norms have been with us from antiquity, as the 
Justinian Code illustrates: “The precepts of the law are these: to live 
honestly, to injure no one, and to give every man his due.”138 
The availability of the printed word, however, created the ability to 
contain and transmit relatively large doses of information, intact and to a 
wide audience. The effect of this advance on the law was to lessen the need 
for extreme compression, by replacing memory with printed text. The 
importance of such chestnuts as “caveat emptor,” “possession is nine tenths 
of the law,” and “he who seeks equity must have clean hands” has 
diminished in recent years.139 Still, legal maxims provide a rich domain for 
the study of compressed blends and the way they are expanded to manage 
vast legal thought. They can also provide guidance in how to teach the law 
more effectively to the general public. 
IV.  A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA: EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
OF GOOD AND BAD BLENDS 
So far in this Article, we have used the existing science of blending to 
make after-the-fact observations about blends in law that seem to have 
worked well and other candidate blends that have worked less well. In 
principle, legal scholars could develop before-the-fact empirical and 
perhaps even experimental inquiries into what makes for a good or bad 
blend in the law. As an illustration of these before-the-fact empirical 
inquiries, let us take a simple and clear case from the very common idea of 
an infinite sequence. Obviously, no mind can hold such a sequence 
explicitly in working memory: they are infinite!  The counting numbers or 
the passage of time are both infinite sequences that we compress to small 
working blends and that we expand as needed to make it possible for us to 
work with any part of the sequence. We can make hypotheses about the 
ease or difficulty with which a human being will be able to make a 
compressed blend that lets us manage an infinite sequence. 
For example, here is a demonstration, which we thought up, and 
which we have run many times in many groups. We made a hypothesis 
before running these demonstrations in groups. First, the task, which you 
 
 137. MERLIN DONALD, ORIGINS OF THE MODERN MIND: THREE STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF 
CULTURE AND  COGNITION 323 (1991); Oliver Goodenough, Cultural Replication Theory and Law 11–
12 (The Gruter Inst. Working Papers on Law, Econ., and Evolutionary Biology, Vol. 1, Art. 3, Oct. 9, 
2001), available at http://www.bepress.com/giwp/default/vol1/iss1/art3.  
 138. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 1.1.3 (John Baron Moyle ed., trans., 2002). 
 139. E.g., HERBERT FUNK GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 274, 307 (1927).  
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can try for yourself: take the sequence 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, . . . . What is the next 
number? It is easy: 11, followed by 13, 15, 17 . . . . Now take a second 
sequence: 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, . . . . What is the next number? It is easy: 12, 14, 
16, . . . . Hold those two sequences in mind. Now construct a third sequence 
by blending these two sequences, in which this third sequence alternates by 
first choosing an element from the first sequence, namely 1, then the first 
element from the second sequence, 2, then the second element from the 
first sequence, then the second element from the second sequence, and so 
forth, like this: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, . . . . How does the sequence continue? It 
is easy: 8, 9, 10, 11. 
But now, use the same two sequences, and blend them again by 
alternating between them, but this time start with the second sequence 
rather than the first, so we get, 2, 1, 4, 3, . . . How does the sequence 
continue? 6, 5, 8, 7 . . . . Very smart people often have great difficulty 
doing this on the fly, ending up laughing as they stumble over the 
sequence. Even when they concentrate hard and manage to do it correctly, 
at least for a while, it takes them much longer to produce the sequence in 
the second case. 
Before we ran these demonstrations, we made the prediction that 
subjects would stumble and laugh and take longer with the second task than 
the first. This is before-the-fact prediction, although not run in an 
experimental setting as yet. We made this prediction on the hypothesis that 
if one can work directly in the blend with a simple compression (that is, 
add one to the last element to get the next element) instead of having to 
work in the mental network, alternating between the two sequences, then 
one will perform better. Actually, there is a compression for the second 
task, although it is not so readily apprehended: subtract one, then add three, 
then subtract one, then add three, and repeat indefinitely. Even so, this is a 
more complicated compression. 
Why do people have difficulty, stumble, and take longer for the 
second task? Both tasks have the identical input sequences. Both tasks ask 
people to construct a third sequence using the identical rule: alternate in 
choosing the next item in the sequence between the two infinite input 
sequences. The only difference in the two task is which of the two infinite 
input sequences we begin with—the even counting numbers or the odd 
input sequences. To that extent, the tasks place identical demands on 
working memory. So the problem is not a problem of memory. It is also not 
a problem for even a basic computing machine because it is not a problem 
of computational difficulty. 
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The difference, we propose, is that for the first task, there is a unified 
blend defined by a simple procedure: just add one to the last number (for 
the positive integers, the formula x=n, in which “x” is the output defining 
the third sequence, and “n” is the position in the constructed sequence). In 
the blend, all one needs to do is hold the last number in mind and do 
something simple to it. This blend can be held in mind all at once, and the 
blend can be used to access and juggle the two inputs. In the first task, one 
does not need to work in the mental network of input spaces; instead, one 
can work directly in the compressed blend. But in the second task, it is 
much harder to get a single, unified blend that can be used to juggle and 
access the inputs. The simplest formula for the sequence would be        
x=n-(-1)
n
, in which “x” is the output and “n” is the position number in the 
sequence starting with 1. This is the rule that would be used by a computer, 
but no human being uses or would use that rule, and it is human thought we 
must study if we want to make sense of what works and what does not 
work in law. 
If we want to store stuff in a room but it does not all fit, there are 
generally two different ways to succeed: get a bigger room, or transform 
the stuff so that it will fit. These are very different, if complementary, 
strategies. Transforming the stuff can include folding it, packing it, 
stacking it, filtering the stuff so as to throw away what you do not need to 
keep, and so forth. Most interesting, transforming the stuff can include 
adding things to it, like, say, stackable storage bins. If we want to stack a 
lot of quality wine in a small space, it might be best to construct the right 
kinds of racks. This may look backwards: it depends on adding yet more 
stuff to the stuff we already cannot get into the room. But that is often the 
right strategy. The specific details of the packing can vary. In Robert 
Crichton’s novel, The Secret of Santa Vittoria,140 the Italian villagers have 
hidden very many bottles of local wine underground from the German 
army at the end of the Second World War. They stacked it very tightly. To 
mislead the Germans, they also stacked a lot of wine bottles above ground, 
in plain view, but they stacked it using a method that requires a great deal 
of space per bottle.141 Another strategy is to filter out what you do not need 
to fit into the room: in the case of the wine, for example, we might want to 
dispense with storing all the plonk. Think of mastering the combination of 
the two inputs sequences 1, 3, 5, . . . and 2, 4, 6, . . . by creating the 
anchoring blend 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, . . . as one way of projecting the inputs to a 
packed blend that can be handled in working memory. The other way of 
 
 140. ROBERT CRICHTON, THE SECRET OF SANTA VITTORIA (1966). 
 141. See generally id. 
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projecting, which creates the blend 2, 1, 4, 3, . . . produces something that 
does not fit so well into working memory. 
To be sure, we have heard and memorized the sequence 1, 2, 3, 
4, . . . many times, and never heard or memorized the sequence 2, 1, 4, 
3, . . . . So, the following questions could legitimately be asked: Is the 
difference in our ability to manage the two sequences just that for the first 
we are reciting from long-term memory, and in the second we do not have 
that assistance? Is the only thing that this exercise shows that we know 
what we know but do not know what we do not yet know? We can run the 
demonstration differently to resolve this question. We can show the same 
effect without calling in long-term memory, by working with sequences 
that we have never heard or memorized. Consider a sequence defined by 
this rule: take every other even integer, beginning at 256, so 256, 260, 
264, . . . . What is the next number? It is easy to generate because there is a 
unitary rule: just add four to the last number. This rule makes the sequence 
seem like one thing. Now hold that sequence in working memory. At the 
same time, consider a very similar sequence with an identical rule: take 
every other even number beginning at 254, so 254, 258, 262, . . . . What is 
the next number in this sequence? It is easy to generate it, because there is 
a unitary rule, and it is the same unitary rule: just add four to the last 
number. This rule makes this second sequence seem like one thing. Now 
hold that second sequence in working memory along with the first 
sequence. What is the sequence that consists of numbers taken sequentially 
in alternation from the two sequences, beginning with 256, so, 256, 254, 
260, 258, 264, 262, . . . ? What is the next number? Everyone finds it 
difficult not to stumble almost immediately. 
Why do we stumble? We have no difficulty holding each of the 
sequences in working memory. If we could hold them both in working 
memory, and go back and forth between them, choosing at each turn the 
next number for the new sequence, we could answer the question and just 
keep going indefinitely, switching back and forth in working memory. 
Let us contrast this difficulty with the ease of performing a very 
similar task. This time, start the new sequence at 254 and switch back and 
forth. Then the resulting sequence is 254, 256, 258, 260, . . . . What is the 
next number? Of course, the answer is 262, and then 264, and then 266, 
and so forth forever. Everyone finds it very easy to continue this sequence 
indefinitely, even though we have not forgotten that the inputs are two 
separate sequences, the first one being 256, 260, 264, . . . and the second 
one being 254, 258, 262, . . . . Why is it so difficult to run the sequence 
256, 254, 260, 258, 264, 262, . . . but so easy to run the sequence 254, 256, 
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258, 260, . . . ? The answer is not, as many have suggested for the positive 
integers in the first example, that we have already heard one but not the 
other. It is not that in one case we are reciting from long-term memory but 
in the other case we are not. It is not that they are put together from 
different inputs. A computer would not have the slightest difficulty running 
any of these sequences, and indeed, a mathematical ranking of the two 
sequences would assign them equal computational complexity. How does 
the human mind work so that running the two sequences feels so different? 
Everyone knows the answer immediately. In both cases we have the 
same two input sequences, and in both cases, we have the same sequence 
rule: take numbers sequentially in alternation between the two input 
sequences. That is how a computer would do it, by creating two sequences 
and alternating between them. But that is not how we do it. For the human 
being, there is a big difference between the two tasks: starting with one of 
the two inputs makes it very difficult to keep going and starting with the 
other makes it very easy. This is because in the second case, there is a 
packed blend—namely a single, unitary sequence defined by a rule: start at 
254 and keeping adding 2 to the last number. There is a congenial, unitary 
blend in this case, and running the blend makes immediate sense. The 
blend anchors the entire network, and lets us keep connected to not only the 
blend but also the two input sequences we started with. So now, we are 
running in working memory three things rather than two, but running three 
things is easier than running two because the third thing is a compressed 
blend that connects to and organizes the network involving the other two. 
More is easier if the more is packed in a congenial way. More is easier if 
the more is a packed blend that lets us grasp and manipulate whatever we 
were trying to hold in mind. For working memory, more is better if the 
more comes about by good blending. Blending changes the task. 
Beginning at 254 provides a packed, unitary, congenial blend. We can 
master the network by “thinking in the blend” rather than “thinking in the 
network.” Beginning at 256 does not let us do that; that is why we stumble. 
Or rather, working in the blend in the case of beginning at 256 requires 
some further work to grasp the blend. Once we think of it, we see that the 
combined sequence beginning at 256 actually does have a rule. The rule is: 
begin at 256, then subtract 2, then add 6, then repeat the pattern of 
subtracting 2 and adding 6. Grasping this blend can make it somewhat 
easier to generate the difficult sequence, although not as easy as generating 
the sequence produced by starting at 254 and adding 2 at every step. 
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A.  EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING INFINITE SEQUENCES WITH 
SHORTER VERSUS LONGER PERIODS 
We have run some empirical investigations to investigate fitting vast, 
indeed infinite, sequences to the human mind. We have several hypotheses: 
(1) human beings do well with an infinite sequence that can be compressed 
to a short periodic cycle with no changes in the cycle that fits perfectly the 
various parts of the vast mental network it compresses; (2) they will do less 
well with longer periods; (3) they will do less well with cyclic blends 
where something in the network changes at each iteration of the cycle; and 
(4) they will do least well with cyclic blends where it is the inside of the 
cycle that changes with each iteration. These are all hypotheses having to 
do with the ease or difficulty of compressions and expansions. 
We presented thirty-one subjects with information taken from periodic 
cyclic blends. For each piece of information, we posed a question, with five 
multiple-choice answers. For some questions, there was only one right 
answer. That is, subjects had enough information to eliminate four of the 
possible multiple-choice answers. For other questions, there was no right 
answer, but the answers followed different patterns. These questions let us 
investigate subject preferences in guessing the sequence. We emphasize 
that our investigations were not memory tests: subjects had all the time 
they want, had the information in front of them, and were provided with 
pencil and paper. Our investigations were also not a math quiz. In most 
cases, there was no right answer. It is, of course, impossible to hold any of 
these infinite sequences explicitly in mind: they are infinite! We 
investigated instead what compressed blends for the sequence were 
congenial to the human mind. 
Consider an infinite sequence that has a period equal to 1, namely -2,  
-2, -2, . . . . We told subjects, “The following five questions all concern the 
same sequence. There is a rule that defines this sequence.” One of the 
questions is, “What is the second missing item in the following? -2, -2, -2, 
__, -2, __.” A subsequent question is, “What is the missing item in -2, -2, -
2, -2, __, -2, -2, -2, -2?” Subjects had already seen that the fifth item is -2, 
so there was a right answer. But the first question we asked was, “What is 
the missing item in the following? -2, -2, -2, __ ?” The multiple-choice 
answers offered were -2, -1, 0, 1, 1. All the answers were possible. The 
Online Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences142 has not the slightest difficulty 
identifying a sequence containing that answer in the sequence. For 
 
 142. The On-Line Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences, OEIS.ORG, http://oeis.org/ (last visited Mar. 
24, 2013). 
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example, -2, -2, -2, 0 is a subsequence of the periodic sequence of order 4 
whose period consists of that subsequence. We asked a variety of such 
questions. 
How did subjects do? For the sequence of -2 repeating, which was a 
sequence of period 1, 100 percent of subjects answered perfectly all the 
questions for which there was a right answer, and 100 percent of subjects 
preferred -2 as the answer for all other questions, even though all the other 
answers were mathematically possible. The data were consistent with the 
hypothesis that subjects had a powerful grasp of infinite sequences with 
periods of 1, and that subjects prefer to grasp such a sequence as a cycle of 
1 with an unchanging interior cycle if it is not clearly wrong. 
Now consider an infinite sequence of a period equal to 3, 
namely Blue, Red, Green, Blue Red, Green, . . . . We told subjects, “The 
following five questions all concern the same sequence. There is a rule that 
defines this sequence. Consider the following sequence: Green, Blue, Red, 
Green, Blue, Red, Green. The first item in the sequence is Green. What is 
the twelfth item in the sequence?” The multiple-choice answers from which 
they could choose were Yellow, Green, Red, White, and Blue. Then, we 
asked them, “What is the missing item in Green, Blue, Red, Green, __, 
Red, Green, Blue, Red?” They could choose Green, Brown, Orange, Red, 
or Blue. We had already shown them that the fifth item was Blue, so there 
was a right answer. All but one subject (97 percent) answered correctly. 
Similarly, consider the question, “Here is the rule that defines the sequence: 
Periodic sequence with period {1,-1,0} where Red=1, Green=-1, Blue=0. 
Which of the following terms belongs to the sequence?” Subjects could 
choose Yellow, Azure, Green, Brown, or Orange. Only Green could be 
correct. 94 percent of subjects answered correctly. Similarly, 94 percent of 
subjects answered the following question correctly: “Recall that all five 
questions in this unit concern the same sequence. Here is part of that 
sequence: Blue, Red, Green, Blue, Red, Green. What is the rule that defines 
the sequence?” and subjects could choose, for Red=1, Green=-1, Blue=0, 
the periodic sequence with period {1, 1, -1, 0}; {1, -1, 0, -1}; {0, 1, 0, -1, 
0}; {1, -1, 0}; or {1, -1, 1, 0}. 
For questions about this sequence where there was no right answer, 
what percentage of subjects preferred the answer that fits a period of order 
3? 94 percent of subjects preferred to see this pattern in response to the 
following question: “What is the missing item in the following? Blue, Red, 
Green, __?” They could choose Green, Brown, Orange, Red, or Blue. 94 
percent preferred to see a pattern of order 3 (BRG) in response to the 
following question: “Consider the following sequence: Green, Blue, Red, 
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Green, Blue, Red, Green. The first item in the sequence is Green. What is 
the twelfth item in the sequence?” They could choose Yellow, Green, Red, 
White, or Blue. 87 percent preferred to see the BRG pattern in response to 
the following question: “What is the second missing item in the following? 
Blue, Red, Green, __, Red, __?” They could choose Green, Orange, Red, 
Blue, or Black. 100 percent preferred to see BRG pattern in response to the 
following question: “Consider the following sequence: Blue, Red, Green, 
__, Red, __. The first item in the sequence is Blue. What is the twelfth item 
in the sequence?” They could choose Yellow, Green, Orange, Red, or Blue. 
While we did not give the subjects enough information to deduce the 
correct answer (there was one; it is the case, however, that higher order 
sequences, including extravagant blends, can create sequences in which any 
choice is correct), the data presented were consistent with the hypothesis 
that subjects had a good grasp of infinite sequences of short period. In this 
case, the period equaled 3. These data were also consistent with the 
hypothesis that subjects preferred to grasp such a sequence as a cycle of the 
shortest unchanging period they can. 
But now what happens with an infinite sequence with a longer period, 
7, and identical values in different positions of the period: 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 
1 . . . . This is the sequence of semitones between notes of the diatonic 
major scale. 1 equals 1 semitone. 2 equals 2 semitones. This sequence is 
otherwise known as a repeating cycle—whole, whole, half, whole, whole, 
whole, half, now repeat. And here is another such sequence: 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 
2 . . . . This is the sequence of semitones between notes of the natural minor 
scale. This sequence is in fact the same infinite sequence as the previous 
one, but beginning in a different spot (sixth note or sixth interval). 
Mathematically, they are identical as infinite sequences. Human beings, of 
course, hear the two scales very differently. 
For both the major and natural minor sequences, when we wrote out 
the elements of the period and told subjects that it repeats, and asked them 
which of five choices can belong to the sequence, everyone scored 100 
percent. They could just check whether the choice is in the list and 
eliminate all but one. 
Otherwise, subjects had various preferences in guessing the sequence. 
For 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1 . . . , we asked them: “The following five questions all 
concern the same sequence. There is a rule that defines this sequence. What 
is the missing item in the following? 2, 2, 1, __?” They could choose -2, -1, 
0, 1, 2. 87 percent (twenty-seven subjects) chose 1. 6.5 percent (two 
subjects) chose 2. 6.5 percent (two subjects) chose something else. While 
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all of these answers could be correct, 93.5 percent preferred 1 or 2. 
Perhaps the 87 percent were preferring two cycles of period 2, 
alternating: 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, . . . . Indeed, for the following 
question: “What is the second missing item in the following? 2, 2, 1, __, 2, 
__?” (they could choose -1, 0, 1, 2, or 3), 81 percent (twenty-two subjects) 
of those twenty-seven subjects who chose 1 now chose 2, which would 
make the sequence 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, . . . . 
What these experiments demonstrate is that people seem to be able to 
handle tolerably well cycles that have unchanging interior structure in 
which each repetition of the cycle changes a tally outside the cycle. The 
tally gives us information about where we are in the sequence. Suppose it is 
January 1, 2012. Cycle through a year and start over. Now, it is 2013. Do it 
again and it is 2014, and so forth. Suppose you are thirty years old. Cycle 
through a year and start over. Now, you are thirty-one years old. Do it 
again and you are thirty-two years old, and so forth. In dealing cards, the 
dealer will sometimes recite 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 2, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 3, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 4, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 5, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. This replacing of the first item in 
the period with the number of the cycle in which the dealer is located helps 
provide information about where the dealer is in the sequence. 
Each of the infinite sequences considered so far can be thought of as 
composed of repetitions of a single invariant cycle, like the cyclic day. By 
contrast, our subjects had greater difficulty dealing with cyclic sequences in 
which the cycle has a parameterized change inside the cycle from iteration 
to iteration. For example, consider the “sequence of sequences”: 1, 1, 2, 1, 
2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 4, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1, . . . . Again, notice that for a computing 
machine, this is a trivially easy infinite integer sequence. We can program a 
computer in a minute to generate this sequence, check on questions about 
it, and so forth. Not so for the human being. Below is a suite of questions 
we asked subjects. By the end of the third question, only {4, 1} fit the rule 
of the choices offered to the subjects, but only 48 percent of our subjects 
answered the third question correctly. 
The following three questions all concern the same sequence. 
There is a rule that defines this sequence. 
(1) Consider the following sequence: 17, 18, 19, 1, 2, 3, 4 . . . . The 
first item in the sequence is 17. What is the twelfth item in the sequence? 
(Multiple choice: 10, 9, 8, 7, 6). 
(2) What is the missing item in 13, 14, 15, 16, __, 18, 19, 20, 1? 
(Multiple choice: 16, 17, 18, 1, 2). 
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(3) Here is the rule that defines the sequence: The infinite sequence 
composed of successive finite sequences each consisting of the integers 
from 1 to n+1 for n=0, 1, 2, 3, . . . Which of the following subsequences 
belongs to the sequence? (Multiple choice: {7, 2}; {5, 4}; {4, 1}; {28, 14}; 
{3, 2}). 
We saw a great deal of varied choice when subjects tried to grasp the 
underlying sequence. Here was a suite of questions we asked: 
The following five questions all concern the same sequence. 
There is a rule that defines this sequence. 
(1) What is the missing item in the following? 3, 4, 1, __. 
 [55 percent of our subjects chose 2.] 
(2) What is the second missing item in the following? 3, 4, 1, __, 3, 
__. 
 [90 percent chose 4.] 
(3) Consider the following sequence: 3, 4, 1, __, 3, __ The first item in 
the sequence is 3. What is the twelfth item in the sequence? 
 [29 percent chose 5.] 
(4) What is the missing item in 4, 5, 6, 7, __, 2, 3, 4, 5 ? 
 [100 percent chose 1.] 
(5) Recall that all five questions in this unit concern the same 
sequence. Here is part of that sequence: 10, 11, 12, 1, 2, 3 What is the rule 
that defines the sequence? 
 [The choices are: Hours struck by a clock in order; The infinite 
sequence composed of successive finite sequences each consisting of the 
integers from 1 to n+1 for n=0, 1, 2, 3, . . . .; For whole numbers “n,” sum 
of digits “n” written in base 7; For whole numbers “n,” sum of digits “n” 
written in base 13; n7 mod 14.] 
 [45 percent chose the sequence of sequences.] 
Again, this investigation was not a memory test. Subjects had all the 
time they wanted and were provided with pencil and paper. Neither was it a 
math test per se. Our subjects were undergraduates at an elite California 
research university and we had their SAT scores. An algorithm recognizes 
these sequences immediately and, for the questions that have no uniquely 
correct answer, the algorithm finds acceptable sequences for all of the 
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answers.143 But the human subject is not the robot. These are vast, infinite 
sequences. Obviously, none could be held in mind explicitly. Accordingly, 
the following questions become crucial: For vast mental networks, such as 
in the case of these integer or repeated categorical sequences (such as a 
sequence of colors), which kind of compressed blends are congenial to the 
way human beings think? What makes a vast mental network manageable 
in limited working memory? These are central questions for law as well. 
For law, policy, ruling, and interpretation, what kind of compressed blends 
can best be managed by people? How can we construct and present those 
compressed blends when we construct laws, policies, rulings, and 
interpretations? What kind of testimony is based on compressed blends that 
make it reliable? What kind is not, making it unreliable? This is not a 
standard way of doing research in the law, but it could become a research 
program. This is not a standard way of teaching law, but it could become a 
line of teaching in law schools. 
Research looking at how we might bridge the mismatch between vast 
legal mental networks and the proclivities of the human mind can help us 
inquire into a number of questions in the law. What testimony can we 
reasonably expect to be accurate? Which arguments can we reasonably 
expect to be memorable and persuasive?  Which rulings can we reasonably 
expect to be understood, learned, and reactivated? Which laws can we 
reasonably expect to be intelligible, memorable, tractable, and have a 
system for consensual expanding? 
Actually, the beginnings of legal theory, in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, were 
cognitive to the core, asking questions much like these, and proposing 
answers on the basis of anecdotal experience and intuition.144 What we are 
proposing is a revival of that approach to law, but with the benefit of the 
empirical and experimental techniques of modern cognitive science. 
V.  AN EXAMPLE OF THE STRUGGLE TO ACHIEVE A COMMON 
AND EFFICIENT COMPRESSED BLEND: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
Because economic growth often depends on profiting from innovation, 
intellectual property is a crucial concern to lawmakers crafting domestic 
 
 143. Examples of how the algorithm works are available at The On-Line Encyclopedia of Integer 
Sequences. See id.  
 144. See Alexander Nehamas, Introduction to ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS, 
at xiii (David J. Furley & Alexander Nehamas eds., 1994) (discussing “methods of persuasion that are 
proper to a systematic field, the character of the speakers who use those methods, and the emotions 
appropriate for speakers to induce in their listeners so that they will be convinced and react positively”). 
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and treaty law.145 Strengthening these rules has been an explicit priority of 
the United States.146 Compliance remains a huge problem, not only in 
countries such as Russia147 and China,148 but also in the United States.149 
Property law is an input to the blend of intellectual property, but not 
all elements of the idea of property are projected to the blend, and there are 
strong disagreements about what projections are appropriate and what new 
elements should emerge from the blend. If someone takes a bound book, 
then the owner does not have it, and so cannot read it or give it to a friend 
or bequeath it. But if the book is digital, and someone “takes” it, the owner 
still has it and can read it and give it to friends and so forth. Which 
projections would be needed from the input of “property” to the blend for 
“intellectual property” in order for an action in the blend to count as 
“theft.” Can a thing that was neither created nor purchased by its 
“owner”—such as a gene—be his patentable intellectual property? As 
Justice Scalia discussed, the extension of structure from one space (in our 
current discussion, real and personal property) to others (for example, 
creative works and genes) is anything but straightforward.150 New law will 
be needed in the blend, but that law has not yet been settled. 
 
 145. See MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE, DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE 
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9 (1998); Michael H. Armacost, Foreword to id. at vi; Michael 
L. Doane, Trips and International Intellectual Property Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 
9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 465, 465 (1994); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, National Obligations Under 
Intellectual Property Treaties: The Beginning of a True International Regime, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 591, 592 
(2000); Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL 
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Region (Sept. 18, 2000), available http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/bulletin/ 
wipoconthai.pdf. 
 146. See Intellectual Property Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ARCHIVE, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/e/eeb/tpp/c22886.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2013) (stating that the Office of International 
Property Enforcement participates in efforts to “strengthen the fight against trade in counterfeit and 
pirated goods worldwide”). 
 147. David E. Miller, Combating Copyright Infringement in Russia: A Comprehensive Approach 
for Western Plaintiffs, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1203, 1204–05 (2000).  
 148. John R. Allison & Lianlian Lin, The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes Toward Property Rights 
in Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 735, 766–67 (1999); Jennifer S. Fan, The 
Dilemma of China’s Intellectual Property Piracy, 4 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 207, 217–18 
(1999). 
 149. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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Even when lawmakers agree on how to compress many input-domains 
into the intellectual-property blend and codify this compression in law, 
compliance rests on the ability of citizens to expand that compression. The 
compressed blend called “property” works as well as it does for tangible 
items because citizens can easily expand it for application to their 
individual circumstances, and because actions that violate the standard 
expansion of this blend usually trigger indignation among observers.151 
In the case of intellectual property, it appears that citizens have 
difficulty expanding the blend for application to their individual 
circumstances. Very few Americans know their “fair-use” rights when it 
comes to excerpting printed material, and the laws regarding digital 
reproduction and rights management are especially arcane: the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which implements two 1996 
Intellectual Property Organization Treaties, alone is fifty-nine pages long 
(double-spaced);152 bureaucratic agencies from the Library of Congress’s 
Copyright Office to the Austin Community College District have published 
administrative rules to govern its implementation;153 and at least half a 
dozen important court opinions interpret the law.154 Moreover, citizens 
appear to carry a range of competing compressions (for example, the idea 
that whatever does not discernibly harm another is okay) which expand to 
guide behavior in ways that would seem to clearly violate the law, but do 
so without triggering indignation among most observers.155 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Legal concepts are the result of a creative process of cognitive 
blending. Blending is a process unique to cognitively modern humans, and 
 
 151. There are, of course, exceptional cases in which competing blends may be allowed: Robin 
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allows us to implement rules that span time, space, causation, and agency. 
There are many signs of this blending in law, but we will conclude by 
discussing three: compression, selective projection, and emergent 
structures. 
A.  COMPRESSION 
The rule of law is impossible without the compression of vast mental 
networks into human-scale cognitive blends. John Marshall argued that no 
human could hold in working memory the vast scope of the U.S. 
government, and he wrote this nearly two hundred years ago, when that 
government had a tiny fraction of the scope of modern national 
governments: 
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of 
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they 
may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal 
code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would 
probably never be understood by the public.156 
For the Constitution to be comprehensible to citizens, the framers had 
to compress a massively complex system into a description of fewer than 
five thousand words, and yet be specific enough that citizens, lawmakers, 
and judges could expand it to guide their behavior. To put this achievement 
in perspective, the terms of service for iTunes, a piece of free software 
from Apple Co., is more than three times as long as the Constitution. 
B.  SELECTIVE PROJECTION 
Legal concepts are created and maintained through a highly creative 
mapping process that requires the compression of a messy reality into a 
simple logic that can be expanded again to guide decisionmaking in other 
messy environments. Stare decisis—without which no citizen could have 
confidence in the stability of his rights and responsibilities—is itself an 
exercise in projecting past decisions into a blend with present facts. This 
point could be viewed as an extension of Justice Scalia’s argument that 
common law is not based on simple analogies but careful and creative 
adaptations.157 
In describing the creative adaptation of common law, Justice Scalia 
offers the example of an attorney arguing that his client has standing to sue 
 
 156. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). 
 157. See SCALIA, supra note 115, at 8. 
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a computer-repair firm hired by her husband. In a previous case, an 
aggrieved neighbor was denied the right to sue a house painter for painting 
the house next door the wrong color, because of the doctrine of “privity of 
contract”—that is, because he was not a party to the violated contract. 
Justice Scalia writes that the attorney in the new case should argue that the 
old case is “distinguishable,” and therefore does not preclude his client 
from suing the computer-repair firm despite not being a party to the 
contract.158 Distinguishability is a key feature of cognitive blending, which 
differs from simple analogical reasoning in that it projects inputs 
selectively into the blend. 
C.  EMERGENT STRUCTURE 
Imagine you own a factory, and I pay you to take me on a tour of the 
factory. If I were to steal a widget while I was in your factory, I could be 
prosecuted for theft. Now imagine that you own a film-production 
company and I pay you to watch your film. If I were to copy down the 
dialogue while watching your movie and produce an exact replica of your 
movie, I would again be liable for stealing—this time, for stealing your 
intellectual property. As discussed above, the notion of intellectual property 
is a blend that includes, among other things, inputs from the mental 
network of property law and inputs from the mental network of speech. 
This blend also has emergent structure. 
As an example of the emergent structure of the intellectual-property 
blend, if I make a movie that copies elements of your movie, it may be 
permissible if I am engaging in satire or criticism, because in that case my 
work is protected speech.159 If, on the other hand, I am simply reproducing 
your work with the goal of profiting off your idea, this is theft. The 
difference between these two might be as little as the difference between 
presenting the material as a sarcastic response or presenting the material as 
a sincere reproduction. When it comes to real or personal property, 
generally, if I take something of yours that you are not willing to give, it is 
theft. But an emergent quality of the intellectual-property blend is that theft 
depends on my attitude and intentions. If I take some dialogue and repeat it 
sarcastically, intending to edify an audience in some innovative way, I may 
not be stealing, even though you are not willing to give me your dialogue. 
Conceptual compression through blending is the essence of law as an 
institution and the engine of our concepts of law, necessarily: law always 
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concerns multiple ideas that stretch across time, space, causation, and 
agency, and requires for its structure compressions tractable for the human 
mind. We have proposed a research program according to which one could 
conduct systematic empirical investigations into what makes good and bad 
blends. 
In general, good blends are those that compress large mental networks 
to human scale, and those where the choice of which inputs to project to the 
blend is widely agreed on and the emergent structures are clear. The fitness 
of a blend, however, can only be measured in a particular context. For 
example, most European Americans have historically had no problem with 
the blend of personal property and geography, called real property. Many 
American Indians, by contrast, have long rejected this blend. The Sauk 
leader, Black Hawk, expressed this rejection eloquently in his 
autobiography: 
My reason teaches me that land cannot be sold. The Great Spirit gave it 
to his children to live upon, and cultivate, as far as necessary for their 
subsistence; and so long as they occupy and cultivate it, they have the 
right to the soil—but if they voluntarily leave it, then any other people 
have a right to settle upon it. Nothing can be sold but such things as can 
be carried away.160 
Since real property is primarily distinguished from personal property 
by its immobility, this constitutes an explicit endorsement of personal 
property and rejection of real property. But Black Hawk’s view of land 
rights, while diametrically opposed to the European view of real property, 
is also familiar and compelling: every child is familiar with a similar set of 
rules governing the use of communal toys. This shows that even the most 
entrenched legal concepts may have compelling alternatives. 
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